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THESIS

A CORPS OF NAVAL STRATEGISTS

by

Charles E. Milsted, Jr.

June 1983

Thesis Advisor:

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T209067

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER

2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.

3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4. TITLE (and Subtitle)

A Corps of Naval Strategists

5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
June 1983

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(s)

Charles E. Milsted, Jr.

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9394010. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

12. REPORT DATE

June 1983

13. NUMBER OF PAGES

144

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)

15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)

UNCLASSIFIED

15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING
SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

strategic planning	German General Staff
long-range planning	corporate planning
U.S. Navy planning	non-relational strategies
British, Israeli French	fusionism
defense planning	

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

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establishments as well as from American corporate business strategic planning. A proposal is offered that would establish a network of specifically educated and trained naval strategists that would be responsible for long-range planning in the U.S. Navy. The plan includes a proposed training, education, career pattern and assignment flow for the network of planners. The aim of the strategic planning network is to improve the effectiveness of Navy long-range planning through enhanced efficiency, consistency and continuity.

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A Corps of Naval Strategists

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Florida Technological University, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1983

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Navy has not formulated a consistent long-range strategic plan.¹ A variety of reasons support this contention, ranging from American cultural characteristics to idiosyncracies inherent in the Naval service itself. Examination of the evidence may indicate that long range strategic planning in the present-day Navy is essentially impossible.

"Since WWII, the need for long range planning has increased. Unfortunately, the priority given to long range planning within the Navy has steadily declined, even as the need for a regular system for accomplishing such planning has steadily grown."²

¹Samuel P. Huntington expressed several common criticisms that have plagued planners since the end of World War II. He states that 1) national security policy lacks unity and coherence. Decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, unguided by an over-all purpose. 2) national security policies are stated largely in terms of compromises and generalities. The real issues are not brought to the highest level for decision. 3) Delay and slowness characterize the policy-making process. Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process", ed. Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965) p. 400. Richard Smoke further suggests that America gave very little notice to national security policy for 125 years prior to World War II. "Until well into the twentieth century, the national security of the United States was granted, nearly free of charge, by nature - that is, by its unique geographical position on the North American continent. It is a fact that at no time in recorded history has any major nation been able to prosper and develop for so long, devoting relatively so little attention and resources to its national security...The United States therefore was able to progress for about 125 years, to almost 1940, with only

Studies commissioned by the Navy relate with certainty, that no single organizational change to the system would result in necessary solutions to problems.³ Therefore, small incremental changes are more in order.

This thesis examines the necessity and feasibility for establishing of a corps of naval strategists. Can the Navy continue to be successful in the future using a part-time approach to strategic planning? Other questions that will be addressed include, is the strategic planning system used by the Navy during wartime suited to peacetime, war-preparation or Cold War periods? Are there ways to adapt some of the advantages of the French and German General Staffs and American General Board to the present-day Navy without

extremely marginal attention paid to what would now be termed national security. Richard Smoke, "The Evolution of American Defense Policy," ed. John F. Reichard and Steven R. Sturm, American Defense Policy, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) p. 97. Without consistent national military objectives, the U.S. Navy as an arm of the government has justifiably not generated long term strategic plans because of ill-defined or changing national objectives. In a speech given at the Naval War College in August 1947, Admiral Robert B. Carney (Later to become the Chief of Naval Operations) stated that the Navy was "wholly unprepared materially and spiritually" for the entry of the United States into World War II. On two previous occasions in the fifty years before 1941 the nation and the Navy had gone to war, each time similarly unprepared, each time later victorious, but each time grievously misreading the military lessons and the political consequences of the conflict. Spain had been the foreseen enemy before 1898, Germany before 1941, and Japan before 1941, but the dominant Navy planners had correctly anticipated and planned for very little else about each of these wars. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946, (Chapel Hill NC: The University of

suffering the unsavory consequences of the former and the inefficiencies of the latter? Would the addition of a Naval strategist network to the present Navy planning system improve the Navy's ability to deal with its own vast organization, sister services, the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies? What career path and career sacrifices will be required of Naval strategic planners?

A. STRATEGIC PLANNING DEFINED

Strategy and its supporting element strategic planning have been variously defined from the grandest level to its perimeter in tactical issues. The definitions for strategic planning have evolved along with the growing concerns with and the direction of strategic thought. Edward Meade Earle relates that,

"Strategy deals with war, preparation for war, and the waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the art of military command, of projecting and directing a campaign...Only the most restrictive terminology would now define strategy as the art of military command.

North Carolina Press, 1966) p. 3. "Since the disestablishment of the Long Range Objectives Group in September 1970, the Navy has not had a regularly constituted long range planning group capable of performing both conceptual and functional planning, nor a group with direct access to the services' highest policy makers." "The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment," Maritime Balance Study, (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 April 1979) p. A-17.

²Ibid., Maritime Balance Study, p. A-1.

³Ibid., p. A-20.

In the present-day world, then, strategy is the part of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation - or a coalition of nations - including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy - sometimes called grand strategy - is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory."⁴

This delineation surfaced during World War II and has most often been modified to accommodate a specific interest.

Another modification attempts to force a more concise definition, but usually resulting in a more generalized version of the original. As difficult as it is to define so broad a concept, it lies outside that indefinable category which includes national interest, public will etc., and some degree of precision can be realized. John M. Collins offers a more modern refinement and a differentiation of the elements of strategy.

"Military strategy is predicated on physical violence or the threat of violence. Equally important, it looks beyond victory toward a lasting peace. Military strategy is mainly the purview of statesmen. Grand strategy controls military strategy, which is only one of its elements."⁵

Both of the above generalized definitions reduce a universe of elements to a single statement. The resulting notion that

⁴Edward Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) p. viii.

⁵John M. Collins, Grand Strategy, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973) p. 15.

is conveyed roughly translates into whatever it takes to accomplish whatever it is you think you should do. If your lot is improved according to your established desires by following the chosen course of action then your strategy is proven successful. Less diligence is exerted in attempting to ascertain why the plan produced success than is exerted in trying to answer why it failed to achieve the desired ends. It is assured that the successful plan contained the universal set of elements required for success, whereas conversely, the failed strategy is examined totally - the set of strategic elements within the plan and those outside the plan. Chance irrational interventions and a host of other foreseeable and unforeseeable factors can have interrupted an otherwise properly planned successful procession of events. Risk, uncertainty and chance can be addressed and estimated, but never with certainty, never universally identified nor managed. Therefore, it can be appreciated that difficulty is encountered when reducing strategy to a set of inclusive elements. This difficulty is far overshadowed by trying to operationalize generalizations on a daily but deadly basis.

Strategies are born out of a long process of deliberations and analysis. They often compromise between imponderables, imperatives and perceptions. A strategy is not a beginning, not a seedbed. Strategies address perceived needs or desires. Objectives (ends), once established serve to focus efforts in the formulation of strategies (means).

1. Interests and objectives establish strategic requirements.
2. Policies provide the rules for satisfying them
3. Available assets provide the means.⁶

The national objectives are generated by a consensus of the public interests and governmental objectives or perceived imperatives. From this universal collection of aims is derived the national military objectives.

"National objectives are specific goals which a nation seeks in order to advance, support or protect identified national interests. National objectives can be broadly categorized as political, economic or security."⁷

To meet the responsibilities established in the latter concern - security - the military services are maintained and charged with guarding the security of the United States.

"The national military strategy is that component of the national strategy prescribing the manner in which the elements of the national military power will be developed and employed. To be effective it must be integral to the national strategy, able to achieve the national objectives in face of the projected threat, and capable of accommodating to change. The U.S. national military strategy includes three principal elements.

1. Deterrence of aggression requires a clear and evident capability and resolve to fight any level of conflict, so that any potential

⁶John M. Collins, Grand Strategy, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973) p. 7.

⁷"Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy," Naval Warfare Publication 1 (Rev. A), (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) p. 1-2-1.

opponent will assess his own risks to be unacceptable. Toward this end the United States maintains forces capable of exerting military power across the entire spectrum of requirements from show-the-flag deployments overseas to retaliation for strategic nuclear attack.

2. Flexible Response. Should deterrence fail, a full range of options for applying military power should be available to control the escalation, scope, intensity and duration of any conflict. Military forces available to provide for flexible response include strategic nuclear forces, theater nuclear forces and general purpose forces.
3. Forward Strategy. The national military strategy of the United States is a forward strategy, driven by geopolitical considerations. The U.S. is characterized by its insular position on the North American continent. It has only two international borders, neither of which is threatened by a hostile force, and communicates with the rest of the world to the east, west and south by way of two major oceans. Additionally, the interdependent free-world economy increasingly depends upon the use of ocean shipping and access to the resources of the seas and sea bottoms. This forward strategy of the United States utilizes the oceans as barriers for the defense of the country, as military lines of communications with overseas allies, and as avenues of world trade."⁸

This broad tasking is further delineated in the mission of the U.S. Navy, as set forth in Title 10, U.S. Code. The U.S. Navy..."is to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of U.S. national interests;

⁸ Ibid., p. 1-2-2.

in effect, to assume continued maritime superiority for the United States. This means that the U.S. Navy must be able to defeat, in the aggregate, potential threats to continued free use of the high seas by the United States. In its simplest terms, defeating the maritime threat means destruction of hostile aircraft, surface ships, and submarines which threaten the seaborne forces of the United States and its allies."⁹ Respective services are tasked with specific primary and collateral functions by the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1.

Meeting the responsibilities levied upon the U.S. Navy of today is an awesome task. Fulfilling the aforementioned charge of being "able to achieve the national objectives in face of the projected threat" is dwarfed in comparison to the charge that follows it "of being capable of accommodating to change." Far-sightedness is crucial to accommodating to change. Future enemy intentions and capabilities must be accurately assessed then applied to a planning continuum. This on-going strategic plan should be able to receive and assimilate change. It will remain the driving force not the force driven by change. If wisely conceived and set to motion the strategy could be fine-tuned by a variation in inputs and adjustments made to meet objectives. There would exist no reason for terminations and new beginnings.

⁹ Ibid., p. 1-3-1.

In order to meet its responsibilities and prepare for the future the U.S. Navy must incorporate a wide range of factors.

"Long range planning in the Navy is made up of a number of different elements, including technological forecasts and schedules for research and development; cost analyses and estimates of future budgets; strategic estimates of future politico-military situations; and statements of future operational requirements for individual weapons systems."¹⁰

Long range planning must define future roles and missions for naval units and propose the means for accomplishing future tasks. Guidance and coordination for this future effort must account for a period five to twenty years in the future. Naval planning is divided into three main time categories. Short term planning ranges up to three years, mid range planning from three to ten years. Long range planning is generally viewed as eleven to twenty years. Time divisions serve to focus efforts but suffer from overlaps in efforts and from ripple-effects of unforeseen events. Planners responsible for developing guidance that takes place under any timeframe heading must be cognizant of planning efforts in the other divisions and must compensate in their own planning by applying various approximation factors of proximate results of other plans.

For purposes of this study, naval strategic planning will include all elements of the navy planning process which are

¹⁰"The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment," Maritime Balance Study, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 April 1979) p. A-1.

used to insure the meeting of the Navy's responsibilities under the national military objectives. These elements include threat assessments, resource allocations, force composition and levels; operational employment and deployment of conventional and nuclear naval forces. An important long range aspect of this process will require accurate forecasting of geopolitical and military situations which in turn demand estimates of future forces necessary to meet responsibilities.

B. CONSTRAINTS ON LONG RANGE PLANNING

Each society has its own set of procedures and its own mechanism in place to plan for its security and future needs.¹¹ Procedures may be very similar but the individual processes will vary according to culture, the form of government, economic and military standing as well as its perception of its own security posture. Established procedures in representative forms of government resemble a set of formulas for avoiding or surmounting obstacles to action rather than a pure administrative mechanism for planning. The idiosyncrasies of each governments determines the nature and force of impediments to action. As a pluralistic democracy, the United States has its own set of unique hinderances to long range planning. The list of encumbrances to the U.S.

¹¹Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., and Richard C. Synder, American Foreign Policy, (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1957) p. 193.

commitment to a consistent long range plan include cultural, political, economic and military factors. America's Naval service additionally, embraces inherent drawbacks to long term strategy.

A cultural trait of the United States that must be considered in military matters is its impatience.¹² Sir Robert Thompson, an impartial but close observer of America's involvement in Vietnam, sighted American impatience as a major contributing factor in our downfall.¹³ Americans detest protracted military operations of any kind but especially those which interfere with their lives for ill-defined or unjustified reasons. During the Korean Conflict after negotiations were begun, the American citizenry turned against the efforts to secure a lasting settlement. Growing unrest with the continued fighting for two years after the onset of talks, culminated with American impatience demanding the cessation of hostilities at almost any cost.

¹²A. Russel Buchanan, "American Attitudes Toward War," ed. Alexander DeConde, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978) p. 16. A concise, definitive portrayal of American cultural characteristics including impatience is presented in Gabriel Almonds', "Public Opinion, Opinion-Makers, and Foreign Policy," Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 56-59. Cultural impatience is also a focus in Stanley Hoffman's, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy," Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 39.

¹³Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam, (New York: David McCay Co., Inc., 1969) p. 125.

Formulating long term strategic plans that will produce continuous, noticeable results in the near term are essentially out of the realm of the possible, given the reality of American impatience. The capricious winds that blow in the United States are driven by rapid, hardhitting media and communication networks that are unparalleled in any other society. This information blitz is aimed at a population descendant from a society born out of revolution. With only glimpses presented of complex situations that appear to change rapidly on the surface, Americans find it difficult to stay a course designed to meet objectives in the distant future amidst what appears to be a shifting threat environment. A.T. Mahan voiced concerns about America's long range views to policy. While discussing whether there would be a revival of a war fleet to protect the proposed Panama Canal he stated, "This is doubtful, however, because a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days."¹⁴ American restiveness does not preclude long range plans, but it indicates a high improbability of a plan's long term acceptability.

Politically, the American style of democracy poses certain impediments to the wide acceptance and adherence to

¹⁴Walter Millis, American Military Thought, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966) p. 210.

an extensive and extended strategic program.¹⁵ The recurring electoral process of the United States is designed to insure that government is infused with updated desires and demands of the public at large.¹⁶ The system is flawed in that the population rarely speaks with a unified voice, is never motivated by eventual outcomes but is driven by short-term needs, i.e., taxes, employment, inflation, etc. Political leaders are obliged to decide on a course of action then sell that decision to the public. We are faced with a leader, who is the product of a multi-faceted, complex machine froth with conflict and who chooses one option over another with much controversy remaining. The leader at the apex of this vast pyramid is judged at intervals on the basis of existing indicators not on the basis of overall or long term consequences of the action. Each elected official along with his manpower force has his performance laid to arbitration before the electorate every two years for members of Congress, four years for the executive branch and six years for the Senate. Effectiveness must be demonstrated by each official to coincide with these intervals in order to be judged competent enough to warrant continuation in the present capacity. With a continuing influx of new ideas and

¹⁵Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 198-199.

¹⁶Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 213.

perspectives each desiring an input to the nation's course, constant revision of any long term policy is inevitable.

The military establishment is by law to be subserviant to the political structure. It is the military's responsibility to inform the political elite of threats and of the military's capacity to meet objectives and defend the nation if called upon. In many cases the newly arrived civilian official is forced to rely upon the military for information or seek outside, often unsanctioned advice. For the president this outside advice is offered from personal advisors -both formal and informal - for the legislator, advice is drawn from or compiled by his own staff. Sound military proposals exposed to so fragmented and interest-diverse a network is faced with early rejection or a drastic watering-down by the consensus-building matrix. A plan to provide long term solutions to projected problems must be more than militarily sound; it must be politically feasible. The barometer for political feasibility varies regularly at two, four and six-year intervals and more often during other periods of time. Acceptance of a long range course for the nation is not possible without deference to changes; a viable long range plan cannot be the product of continuous modification.

Economic obstacles are particularly deleterious to long term strategic initiatives. Even though the military establishment absorbs a majority of the Congress-controllable

national budget,¹⁷ the military exercises no direct control over the allocation of those vast resources. Much effort has gone into streamlining the budgetary process so as to provide planners with fairly accurate estimates of outyear spending levels. Neither reasonably precise five year projections on expenditures nor long range strategic plans can be any more than course guidelines for the future when all spending is subjected to the annual budget review cycle. Out-year projections which are provided as guidelines to planners can drastically altered or rendered useless by the congressional budget process. So many internal and external factors affect the national budget such as inflation,

¹⁷ The 1984 Defense Posture Statement related that total Obligational Authority of \$274.1 billion, a 10% real increase over FY 1983 represents defense spending as equal to 28% of the total federal budget, and 6.8% of GNP. Annual Report to the Congress, Report of the Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request and FY 1984-88 Defense Programs, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983) p. 3. For the 1983 fiscal year which began October 1, 1982, the Pentagon expected to spend (outlays) \$221 billion. As a proportion of the federal budget - 29 cents out of every dollar - or 6% of GNP will be spent for defense in 1983. But of the funds which Congress can debate and apportion each year (three-quarters of the total federal budget is previously obligated for Social Security, interest on the national debt, etc.) 78 percent is earmarked for meeting defense needs. Some expense allocations are of course contested, for example about \$24 billion in the 1983 budget proposal was designated for the Veterans Administration which is considered residual cost of previous wars is not a part of the defense budget nor is the allocation for NASA - the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Sheila Tobias, Peter Goudinoff, Stefan Leader, and Shelah Leader, What Kinds of Guns Are They Buying for Your Butter? (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1982) p. 280-282.

world-wide energy supplies, currency strength, trade and trade partners, etc., that multi-year financial forecasts are essentially not possible even with major modifications to the existing apparatus.

Militarily, long range planning is possible, but the present structure of the national military establishment insures that any plan will be slow in coming and a shared adulteration of the optimum. Autonomy of the service branches has been a criticism of the military force for decades. Since the formation of the Joint Army-Navy Board seeds for conflict between the services have been present. As separate military branches, the Army and Navy reported to the president as Commander in Chief at the cabinet level and both were funded independently of the other service. World War II and the operational theater overlaps made evident the demand for a more unified method of employing armed forces. When plans were being drawn up for the post-war forces, neither the Army, Navy nor the soon-to-be-established Air Force, collaborated on proposals nor correlated efforts at all. With the establishment of the central Department of Defense and single military budget, the services became competitors for the same pot of money. The ability of the individual services to have their propositions accepted and their appropriations requests met were viewed as tantamount to that services' survival or at least independence.¹⁸ In such an environment, long range planning

¹⁸Arnold Kantner, Defense Politics, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979) p. 90.

is achieveable at the individual service level but highly improbable when joined and/or concurred with by the other services.

Idiosyncrasies of the Naval service become stumbling blocks to the generation of long range plans by the single service and to joint proposals by other services. The Navy has since the dissolution of the General Board during World War II, relegated its strategic thought to a series of ad hoc boards and study groups.¹⁹ This procession of temporary efforts were staffed by very capable officers, often the brightest contemporary military minds available.

However, with the high caliber of the individual came fleet operational and career requirements. In many cases the officers did not remain with a study group for more than two years, rarely for the duration of a board. Each Chief of Naval Operations has recognized a need for long range thought and have quickly appointed his own group to study alternatives and make recommendations to him. This has usually resulted in the disbanding of the commission appointed four years before with little pass down of lessons learned to the incoming group. Fresh looks at old problems can be beneficial but much continuity and consistency of effort is lost by the rotation of personnel and ad hoc study group approach to long range planning.

¹⁹Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the U.S. Navy, (Washington, D.C.: Naval Research Advisory Committee, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1980) p. 6-8.

Neither last nor least in the list impediments to long-range strategic planning in the United States is the complexity of day-to-day problems. Difficulty seems to expand to fill whatever time span is allotted. It is virtually impossible to isolate oneself from current crises to look at the future. Unfortunately, many of tomorrow's decisions must be based on or cognizant of the outcome of today's crises.

In summary, there appear to be many hurdles that must be negotiated prior to any operable strategic planning can be initiated. This study will propose an alternative to the Navy's part-time attention paid to long-range planning. By a small, incremental improvement to the present system, the Navy will be able to function more efficiently in the day-to-day realm, perhaps to the degree commensurate with that required for the development of long range strategic thinking.

Chapter Two will examine past and present experiences in long-range strategic planning that have taken place outside the United States military establishment. It is hoped that by comparing the results of the German and French General Staff systems and modern corporate planning accomplishments, some applications can be made to improve the planning process of the U.S. Navy. Analyzing the conditions under which these planning efforts were made and measuring their relative success in meeting the objectives may assist in the development and better understanding of our present problems.

In Chapter Three, the history of the U.S. Navy planning system will be traced to reveal what has been attempted in the past to meet planning objectives an understanding of what has been tried, under what circumstances and what levels of success or failure were achieved could aid in the development of a planning framework that will better prepare the Navy for the future it will face.

Chapter Four will relate the proposal for a corps of Naval strategists. Current planning needs of the Navy will be viewed with an eye toward matching the qualifications and training of the Naval strategists to those needs. The authority, power, influence triangle model will be used to demonstrate that the strategist will have no authority in decision-making, but will be a source of increased power, then influence to the admiral or staff commander where assigned. A career ladder, unique to Naval strategists will be presented, showing sea-shore rotation cycles, training requirements and potential assignments.

The Concluding Chapter will summarize the previous attempts at strategic planning both inside and outside the Navy then weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the corps of Naval strategists proposal. Hopefully some appraisal can be made of the corps concepts' applicability to meeting the long-term needs of the U.S. Navy.

II. COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTS IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING

In examining whether a corps of naval strategists could improve or be useful to the Navy's strategic planning efforts, it is important that there be an understanding of the experiences of the past. Reviewing the attempts of various organization's experience in developing strategic planning processes can shed some light on the matter of matching a planning procedure to a unique set of organizational circumstances. To see how a nation or corporation interpreted its needs and environment, how the system that was devised met the established objectives and what appeared to be responsible for its success or failure can be very beneficial to future efforts. Of particular interest in this study will be the selection, training process and qualifications for the planners involved in other experiences and what positive characteristics can be applied to a Navy planning system. Equally important will be the knowledge of what is not applicable to a modern naval planning process.

The study will initially examine the relationship between the nature of an organization and the planning system devised to meet specific requirements. Next, a comparative analysis of the German General Staff, the French, British and Israeli military planning structures will be presented. Lastly, a glimpse of recent developments in strategic planning in

the corporate business will be examined for potential applicability.

To say that the nature of an institution or organization determines the structure of its planning process is an oversimplification. But, controlling bodies can compel a system to produce a specific type of planning process or can limit or constrain the influence of the planning structure. Various categories of objectives (ends) will also to a degree determine the characteristics of the planning system to be established. For most nation-states the ultimate objective is survival of the society within that nation-state. The process adopted to plan for survival cannot be one given to underestimation of imperatives, contentment with sufficiency nor one blind to competing though subordinate demands. Survival strategy requires that whatever course of action is decided upon it cannot be one that requires test cases - trial and error methods - for measures of its acceptability or validity. A survival strategy is seldom implemented, it remains as a deterrent to other's actions. If called upon though, its stakes are so high that every guarantee of the success of the plan must be sought. It is for this reason that forces involved in the planning and implementing of these strategies tend to overestimate the problems and over-compensate with the accumulation of means available to carry out this plan. Should a nation-state find itself surrounded by weak or content neighbors, its strategies may temporarily

shift to a plan aimed at expansion or consolidation, but its survival is rarely ever jeopardized to accommodate ambitions.

Organizations whose purpose is gain-seeking or maximization of profits can install a more efficient, calculating planning system.²⁰ Trial runs can be a method of adjustment and modification to a strategy. Failure, even though debilitating, can be overcome, and serve to strengthen the organization rather than destroy it.

An organization or institution settles on the planning system to be dependent upon based on its perceptions of needs, threats, goals, environment and what is acceptable/compatible with its unique internal structure. A corporation satisfied with a planning system that consistently produces low capital investment risk and ten per cent growth will appear quite different from a corporation willing to discount risk to maximize profits.

A totalitarian government appears to be a more efficient system for planning. It usually operates with a well-defined, centralized decision-making framework one not driven by an unmanageable number of demand inputs. A monarchy has a single, all-powerful decision-maker where decisions can be made instantaneously and implemented almost as quickly. Totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union rely upon an all powerful

²⁰Michael H. Moskow, Strategic Planning in Business and Government, (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1978) p. 26-32.

controlling group that must respond to relatively few internal and external demands. With the apparent efficiency of a totalitarian system comes increased internal security demands. Internal control is generally maintained by force which requires a diversion of some efforts and resources for the maintenance of and continued legitimization of the centralized control structure.²¹

Democratic societies greatly complicate the decision-making process. Being forced to reach a consensus from a complex interest-diverse population on all major issues, insures that most decisions will be late and lacking. In the nineteenth century De Tocqueville suggested that

"a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking...that democracies obey the impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of prudence."²²

A century later, Walter Lippman felt that de Tocqueville's observations were becoming an increasingly accurate portrayal of American public's role in national security policy-making. He was quoted by a scholar as suggesting that,

"the people have imposed a veto upon the judgements of the informed and responsible officials. They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace, and

²¹Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., and Richard C. Snyder, American Foreign Policy, (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1957) p. 7.

²²Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945) vol. 1, p. 234-235.

too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this century. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and death."²³

America operates under a complex form of representative government, but each democracy struggles under the burden of endless public debate, decision arbitration and course changes. Seemingly the more crucial the decision or urgent the response the more dysfunctional in making the decision or agreeing on the response the democracy appears to be. Under this system, long-term issues suffer even more excruciating uncertainties. Lippman adds that,

"The record shows that the people of the democracies, having become sovereign in this century, have made it increasingly difficult for their governments to prepare properly for war or to make peace."²⁴

A. THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

Any discussion in praise of the German General Staff and its predecessor the Prussian General Staff, must take into account the unique cultural, military and geo-political characteristics of the society out of which it was born. The Prussian General Staff is a product of the environment that remained after the Thirty Years War. This phase of European development is identified by a combination of

²³Melvin Small, "Public Opinion," ed. Alexander DeConde, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978) Vol. III, p. 844.

²⁴Walter Lippman, The Public Philosophy, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955) p. 24.

absolute monarchy with a standing army. The observation of historian von Behrenhorst roughly summarizes the national base out of which rose one of the most efficient militaristic societies in history:

"the Prussian monarchy was not a country that had an army, but an army that had a country which it used as a billeting area."²⁵

The foundation of the Staff was formed out of the minor nobility class. This comparatively small number of noble families saw military service to the crown as its stepping stone to greater prominence from what was an eroding financial and noble status base.

The limited consolidation of the principal regions of Northern Europe under Frederick the Elector and primarily under Frederick the Great laid the basis for the rise of Prussian militarism and the raising of the political sights for the nation-state. Prussia was surrounded by stronger neighbors. The Russians to the East, the Hapsburg-Austrian Empire, the French to the South and the great seapower England. Couple a perceived external threatening environment, a fear of encirclement or dismemberment, the absolute authority and efficient decision-making apparatus of a monarchy ambition generated by a glimpse of world class stature and influence brought on by Frederick the Great with

²⁵Walter Goerlitz, translated by Brian Battershaw, History of the German General Staff, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., Publishers, 1959) p. 2.

a powerful, elite devoted to serving the King and the seedbed for military elitism is prepared. The State was supreme.

"The officer began to look upon himself as the servant of the monarch in whom the State was held to be personified."²⁶

This sworn loyalty to the King served as the moral foundation of the army to come and was responsible for the highly distinctive mental attitude of the Prussian and later German officer corps.

B. BEGINNING OF THE STAFF CONCEPT

The German General Staff was a product of a long historical evolution, credited by some as having stemmed from the organization of Frederick William of Prussia in 1635.²⁷ In the mid-1700's Frederick the Great inherited a trained, growing army from his great-grandfather the Great Elector. Like his predecessor, Frederick the Great acted as his own Chief of Staff. He did retain, however, a Quarter-master-General Staff numbering approximately twenty-five officers, serving primarily a logistic rather than strategic operations function. His staff was responsible for engineering functions such as planning and supervising routes of march and choosing of camping sites and fortified positions.²⁸

²⁶Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 4.

²⁷Carey Brewer, "The German Staff of the German Army" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings February, 1956, p. 158.

²⁸Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 5.

From this beginning the staff concept was to grow in size and influence. In summarizing the history of Prussia it is important to note that the fearsome power of the Prussian-German nation evolved from the consolidation of regional societies into one unit²⁹ in response to the environment of strengthening neighbors.³⁰ Without the unwavering service of the nobility as officers seeking to regain family prestige coupled with a strong, innovative single ruler, it is doubtful that the nation would have reached world military status. After suffering a major defeat at the hands of Napoleon, the General Staff expanded its influence and regained its composure before the century ended by winning a series of splendid little wars. It ushered in the period of warfare that was characterized by short, decisive, minimally disruptive encounters between armies. Prussia's military exploits resulting from its General Staff proficiency became the model for nearly all modern armies of the nineteenth century.

The staff concepts' unprecedented rise to prominence would not have been likely had the reign of strong military leader/Kings such as Frederick the Great continued. A

²⁹Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 7.

³⁰Bismarck is said to have suffered from the *Cauchemar des Coalitions*, the old German fear that the great powers of Europe would conclude a grand alliance in order to destroy the natural preeminence of Germany in Europe. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Prospects of German Foreign Policy" in The Defense Policies of Nations, ed. Douglas J. Murray, and Paul R. Viotti, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) p. 365.



procession of militarily inept monarchs allowed the expansion and dominance of the General Staff. The peak in General Staff influence came during World War I. Complete control of military affairs had consistently been denied the General Staff. The combination of weak leadership by the monarch and the war ministry and under constant pressure from the General Staff, direct control of military matters was granted to the General Staff. The war ministry was left with the responsibility for logistical and administrative support only. With direct access to the single decision-maker the General Staff could dictate strategy and tactics as it saw fit. With the further weakening of the monarch the Chief of the General Staff essentially became a dictator. The disastrous heaping of resources, human and otherwise, were due largely to the General Staff's unwillingness to surrender.

Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the General Staff was disestablished by treaty, but in name only. The staff system continued to operate much as it did before the war but temporarily under a different title. Never was the Great General Staff to again reach the heights of influence it held during the First World War. Hitler disliked and distrusted the General Staff and never felt the need to have a talk with his Chief of Staff.

1. Formed Out of a Nation

"Empire created in 1871 by Bismarck's diplomacy and Prussian military power, despite its institutional similarities to the Western constitutional regimes,

was and remained an authoritarian state that recognized neither the theory nor the practice of popular sovereignty and self-government; and that meant that Germany entered the Twentieth Century without the kind of tradition that might have enabled it to meet the hard problems that were awaiting it."³¹

This is completely different from the beginnings of democracy in America. Our nation was born out of the enlightenment period. The American and French revolutions prepared the stage for the rising of nationalism. Safeguards against military control were built into the American Constitution. The State was not to be supreme but was to serve the needs of the public. This is no insurance that a nation cannot abandon a constitutional base and change radically, but its foundation if continually successful in meeting the needs of the nation serves to dampen wild swings of the national policy pendulum and resists the subsuming of national interests to a single coercive force.

The American form of government cannot guarantee against the realization of the fears of a rampant militarism such as the Great General Staff, but should that system arise in America it will be a result of fundamental changes in the American system. The American system of checks and balances and public control over government makes impossible the rise of a policy dictating military elite without a conscientious

³¹Gordon A. Craig, The Germans, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1982) p. 33.



relinquishing of liberty by the people. This can only occur if the ideal of America is fundamentally altered. If a military dominated society emerges from what is today America it is then no longer America from which it emerged.

2. Selection, Qualification and Training

Warfare in the Nineteenth Century began to change under the influence of two revolutionary forces. The emphasis in warfare shifted from the mathematic science of war to the concern for the after effects of political upheaval. Political objectives increasingly dominated military action. Concentration on the status of governments after war placed conflicting limits on the conduct of war. The mass age joined by rapid technological change forced armies into increasing military specialization. Governments grew in size and complexity just as the armies did. Rapidly expanding bureaucracies became the order for both arms of government. The French Revolution and the new wave of nationalism began to be felt and measured in other societies. The Prussian General Staff had emerged from the stratified feudal society of Prussia but ran headlong into the sharply opposite influence of nationalism. The professional militarism begun during the eighteenth century was not to be reconciled with the revolutionary implications until the time of the Prussian strong monarchies and reformer, General Gerhard Johann Scharnhorst.

3. Qualifications

Even though serving as his own chief of staff and planner Frederick the Great recognized the need for subordinate engineering assistance to manage the details of mounting a campaign. The twenty-five officers comprising the Quartermaster-Generals Corps provided a vital link between the master strategist and those commanders responsible for execution of orders. With increased military stature and activity the Quartermaster General Corps expanded to meet increased needs.

"With the addition of the Brigade Majors the Quartermaster Generals Corps took on the trappings of a general staff."³²

The Brigade Majors were officers who were assigned to assist generals by compiling data and reports. The officers moved from place to place to assist where specifically needed. The king made the training of these officers his own personal concern. He demanded that the twelve best pupils of the Academic des Nobles in every year being taken for Brigade Major posts.

As much for his desire for personal control as for increased efficiency, Frederick the Great developed the practice of assigning an Adjutant-General or an aide-de camp to each field commander to serve as a royal commissar. During the Seven Years War, seven such adjutants-general were assigned

³²Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 5.

to the infantry and cavalry. After 1758 only one adjutant-general position was maintained with Heinrich Wilhelm von Anhalt becoming the most influential. He reached the level of Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General. After playing a crucial role in the partition of Poland and in the war of the Bavarian succession of 1778, von Anhalt, for all intents, became Frederick the Great's Chief of Staff.

Following the death of Frederick the Great in 1786 military control shifted from the monarch to the army especially to the powerful staff system. By the early 1800's the army command was grappling with the Napoleonic wars and the shock waves of nationalism from the French Revolution. The prevailing Prussian adherence to State supremacy was being challenged by a second school of thought. 1807-1813 saw the emergence of the opinion opposing absolute state power represented by Stein, Hardenburg, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Humbolt. They maintained that the strongest government was the one that could mobilize the energies of its subjects by giving them rights to match their responsibilities.³³ Efforts toward reform of the army and the staff came more to the fore with the Prussian defeat at Jena 1806.

³³ Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) p. 45.

Scharnhorst introduced the idea of examinations as a prerequisite to promotion and raised the pay of officers so as to decrease their reliance upon outside income.³⁴

After the earlier insistence of aristocracy service to the king by Frederick the Great, the Prussian officer corps in 1806 was composed of only 700 non-nobles in a corps of 7,100. The early military schools to educate nobles for the officer corps were uniformly poor. Curricula were designed to either instruct officers in diplomatic service or engineering/artillery functions. But after reforms were implemented the Prussian military training system improved significantly.

"While all the nations of Europe by 1875 had acquired the basic elements of military professionalism, in Prussia alone were these elements developed into a rounded and complete system. Requirements of general and special education for entry; examinations; institutions for higher military education; advancement by merit and achievement; an elaborate and efficient staff system; a sense of corporate unity and responsibility; a recognition of the limits of professional competence; these Prussia possessed to an extraordinary degree."³⁵

4. General Staff Training

"The Germans have always appreciated that there was virtue in building the military brain before the military body. In this they have often stood in sharp contrast with other great powers."³⁶

³⁴Gordon A. Craig, The Germans, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1982) p. 32.

³⁵Ibid., Huntington, p. 31.

³⁶James D. Hittle, The Military Staff. (Harrisburg Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1961) p. 51.

Any broad discussions of the German General Staff concept require an understanding that the General Staff of World War I was a product of nearly three centuries of change. In order to determine what aspects of the staff concept might apply to today, the following remarks about officer training will be presented as broadly as possible but where major changes occurred over time, an effort will be made to relate only the most appropriate or most historically recent information.

As stated in the beginning, the Staff Officer Corps was comprised largely of members of the nobility. After the reform process was begun under the guidance of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau the officer ranks were opened to all men regardless of origin. The decree opening the officer ranks also marks the accepted date for the beginning of the Great General Staff, August 6, 1808. On that date, the Prussian government issued its decree on the appointment of officers which set forth the basic standard of professionalism with uncompromising clarity: The only title to an officer's commission shall be, in time of peace, education and professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all individuals who possess these qualities are eligible for the highest posts. All previously existing class preference in the military establishment is abolished, and every man,



without regard to his origins, has equal duties and equal rights.³⁷

At the close of the nineteenth century the prestige and quality of the General Staff Corps was at its peak. Acceptance for training for the Staff Corps required the successful completion of a rigorous training program.

"As a result of rigid competitive examinations, a few candidates (approximately 150 during the years immediately preceding World War I) were selected from the entire officer corps to begin a three-year course of intensive study at the famous Kreigsakademie. At the end of this course, roughly thirty per cent of the candidates passed a competitive examination covering, in addition to subjects of a military nature, such matters as personality, character, general education and personal behavior. These successful candidates then were "commended to the Great General Staff," usually for a term of two years.³⁸

The two years of application of education on the General Staff was in effect an apprenticeship. Candidates were assigned to various divisions within the Staff Corps where they could apply their military education to the solution of specific problems in three distinct phases.

1. Weekly tactical exercises on maps;
2. More ambitious exercises directed by the department chiefs at the end of the winter;
3. Participation in the several strategic exercises personally conducted each year by the Chief of the General Staff himself.³⁹

³⁷Ibid., Huntington, p. 30-31.

³⁸Ibid., Brewer, p. 160.

³⁹Ibid., Brewer, p. 160.



Definite assignment to the General Staff came only after successfully passing a third competitive examination. Of the 150 candidates accepted at the academy only four or five remained to be assigned permanently to the Staff. A reserve of Staff Officer candidates was maintained from those rejected at various intervals in the training program. Failure in the later stage did not preclude eventual assignment to the Staff.

5. Formal Education

Vast improvements in the educational preparation of Staff officers were begun in 1810 with the establishment of the Kriegsakademie by Scharnhorst. Candidacy for admission to the War Academy and the Staff Officer Training program followed five years of military service, certification by one's commanding officer and passage of the previously mentioned ten day special examination. The required subjects included tactics, military history, science of arms, field and permanent fortifications, military and political administration and economy, mathematics, artillery, special geography and geology, staff duty and military jurisprudence. About one-half of the academic work was elective and the officer could choose among universal history, universal geography, logic, physics, chemistry, literature, higher geodesy, higher mathematics, French and Russian.

By any measure available, the Kriegsakademie was the premier military institution of its time. It produced about

fifty per cent of the military literature of Europe. Foreign observers marveled at the academy's success in generating self-reliance, and its ability toward forming and disciplining the minds of its students. Attendance at the War Academy became a prerequisite to achieving high rank or General Staff assignment.⁴⁰

6. Staff Duty

A prime objective of the German military leaders was to mesh as smoothly as possible the functions of planning and execution. A natural approach to the solution was the establishment of divisions of the General Staff linking field forces and a headquarters staff. The headquarters or "Great General Staff" was located in Berlin (Grosser Generalstab) and the remaining staff units assigned to field commands under the terms "Field Forces General Staff" (Truppengeneralstab)⁴¹ Officers were assigned to either Staff Corps division depending upon rank, experience and career needs. Staff Officers on occasion were given command of field armies but the "General Staff officer was expected always to resist any temptation to command." One of the most successful military teams in Prussian history illustrates the role of the staff officer. Beside the field commander Blucher's racy and somewhat elemental personality, with its impetuous will to attack, the figure of

⁴⁰Ibid., Huntington, p. 48.

⁴¹Ibid., Brewer, p. 158-159.

Scharnhorst, the quiet man of learning, made a strange contrast, for Scharnhorst was in a way the perfect exemplar for all Chiefs of Staff, he was par excellence the man who stands in the background, advises, warns and guides.⁴²

General Staff officers serving with field commands carried out their duties as recognized representatives of the Chief of the General Staff. The usual distribution of officers assigned to field forces were kept to a minimum: at least two senior and several junior General Staff officers on the staff of an army; three to five General Staff officers for an army corps; and a single General Staff officer for a division.⁴³

One of the most important parts of the General Staff's training was the staff journey begun by Scharnhorst. As early as 1805 he arranged for officers of his brigade to reconnoiter areas of planned battles or where maneuvers might occur.⁴⁴ Staff journeys served a dual purpose of minimizing the isolation between the planner and those who would execute orders and also updating contact for the Staff officer with field conditions to guard against a theoretician elite.

An understudy of Scharnhorsts', von Muffling, continued the Staff journeys and made a major improvement by introducing

⁴²Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 39.

⁴³Ibid., Brewer, p. 161.

⁴⁴Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 24.

the Kriegspiel, or war game. Once actual conditions of terrain and geography were determined operational situations were followed through in sandboxes or on maps.⁴⁵

C. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

A review of the history of the evolution of the General Staff, the training and preparation of its Staff officers reveals a military institution unparalleled in professionalism. Three major accomplishments can be seen as a result of the Prussian and German efforts. Most glaring of the achievements was the success experienced in the series of splendid little wars of the mid-1800's. Prussia neutralized her closest enemies and maintained a delicate stability in Europe by fear of its military machine. The military staff effectively projected its perceptions of needs to a monarch who stood in awe of his country's might and who rarely opposed military proposals. General Staff contentions or attempts at being totally apolitical coupled with weak kings and strong military leaders resulted in a wresting of control for military planning and operations from the War Ministry. With unlimited access to the single decision-maker, military leaders were able to dictate measures for the industrialization and militarization of the country. Major commitments of resources, manpower and industrial capacity were channeled to the strengthening of

⁴⁵Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 59.

arms. The country's push to the development and use of railroads and weapons which greatly improved mobilization and military strength are signs of the military influence in the running of the country.

This points to the second and third major achievements of the General Staff system, efficiency of centralization and continuity. Thoroughly training and educating the professional officer corps to levels unsurpassed by the remainder of society, offering a hope of world influence, essentially tied the future of Prussia to the coattails of the military. The single channel of communication within the General Staff network directly to an absolute authority facilitated a decision chain not duplicated anywhere else. This meant that plans generated by the planning/execution model of the General Staff Corps, once approved could be implemented almost immediately. The delegation by the king of much authority in the military strategy realm to the Chief of the General Staff meant that a considerable degree of flexibility was effected in the rigid centralized system.

Continuity of planning, training and operations is a vital link between war, war preparation and peace. Continuity in the Prussian/German military sphere was provided by the network of the highly skilled, dedicated officer corps. Few changes to the General Staff Corps were made over time, most changes were made within the officer corps. Rotation of personnel was held to a minimum to facilitate the development

of expertise rather than exposure to the ways of war. Stressing the anonymous, intellectual guidance aspect of staff duty rather than the ascension to command motivations, further improved the consistency of quality planning and enhanced the touch with the theoretical to the operational requirements of war planning.

D. DRAWBACKS TO THE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT

Success almost always comes at a price. The efficiency and dominance of the German General Staff led not only to great military world status, but eventually to a costly national defeat in war. Without going into exhaustive detail on specific hinderances to the rise of German militarism, the following list can offer some evidence of why the Staff concept modeled closely after the German General Staff is not applicable to the present day American military institution. The list can also allay fears of a similar system arising in America if certain portions of the Staff concept are incorporated.

The first and highest price paid is the loss of freedom accorded citizens under democratic government. Carl von Clausewitz, one of the most influential military thinkers, considered democracy to be a "disaster". With few exceptions the General Staff leaders shuddered at the thought of democracy and fought all attempts to implement spreading revolutionary trends.

"Democracy considered the human personality as a whole, whereas Prussia only understood the ethics of duty and of service to the State."⁴⁶

Even the supremacy of the State concept was modified in desperate situations by von Clausewitz, he taught that

"the existence of the army had priority over that of the State itself...the principle that consciously or unconsciously guided the Reichswehr in the years from 1918-1933."⁴⁷

Many nations have a military staff system similar to and some even predate the German General Staff. A case can be made for the staff concept not being responsible for the rise to absolute militarism but that the lack of governmental controls allowed the rise to military control. It is inconceivable that a military-controlled state could emerge from a democratic, popularly represented society.

It was only when the General Staff was moved from under the War Ministry's control to direct line with the monarchy that unbridled militarism commenced. Balances and decentralization controls in a modern democracy can prevent uncontrolled excursions of the public will.

Even in view of its apparent successes the German General Staff witnessed increasing criticism as the size and complexity of operations increased. The General Staff was responsible for a relatively small, uncomplicated army by modern standards. Many examples exist of General Staff planners' failure to

⁴⁶ Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 63.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 63.

accurately forecast logistical needs. Delays and design inefficiencies were increasingly common after the General Staff ordered a weapon to be developed then failed to monitor progress and allow for lead-time in modifications.

The German General Staff was only successful when a single branch of the military was involved. Once the admiralty and Air Force entered service as divisions of the military, the General Staff predominance began to decline. Acceptable communications links within the Navy could accommodate the Staff Corps system and rapid technological developments in the air service were difficult to manage under the centralized staff corps concept.⁴⁸ Suspicion and competition between services arose and could not be adequately adjusted for by the Staff Corps.

E. CONCLUSION

In spite of many incongruities between the environment in which the General Staff prospered and the milieu of modern America, there are a few functions of the Staff Corps concept that can be applied to the Navy planning process. Included in these applicable functions are:

1. Specialized education and training for the planning role
2. Increased continuity within the present staff system by

⁴⁸Werner Baumbach, translated by Frederick Holt, The Life and Death of the Luftwaffe, (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1949) p. 22-24; 46-49.

- a) improvements in the personnel rotation cycle;
- b) separation of command and planning career requirements;
- c) building staff geopolitical expertise base (effect of staff journeys);
- d) limiting the planning and execution overlaps.

F. STAFF COMPARISONS OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS

Using the German General Staff history as a point of reference, the following will be a comparison of more modern experiences with systems by nations more similar to the United States. Most see the central proper role of military in the political arena as a means to an end, not as an end in itself.

From the perspective of function and status there are three basic staff types:

1. At the highest level are staffs that operate as military agencies of a government. Most modern nations possess some form of supreme or a "national general staff", which exercises control over the armed forces. National level staffs are exemplified by the German "Oberkommando" of World War II, and the joint Chiefs of Staff system of the United States.
2. Departmental Staffs exist at the individual service (Army, Navy, Air Force) level. The function of departmental staffs is to organize, train, equip and employ the service forces according to plan and policy directives.
3. Field staffs function as staff assistants to field commanders.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Ibid., Hittle, p. 5-6.

Staff responsibilities are assigned by established defense policies and their limits of operational autonomy are dictated by form, strength and urgencies of respective governments. Many present-day defense institutions are patterned after the early German General Staff concept. However, it is imperative that each nation assess its own security needs, be cognizant of its cultural, political, fiscal and military constraints then adapt a defense planning model to its unique characteristics. Examining other adaptations to defense planning may offer some insights into useful or practical improvements in the U.S. Navy planning system. It is also important to allay fears that might arise when proposing the application of general staff advantages to the present Navy system. Reviewing defense controls in other democratic institutions should serve to reduce concerns over staff proposals.

1. Israeli

Unique past, threatening environment, defense plans designed for survival, defense decision-making power in Israel has traditionally resided with the prime minister and Cabinet. Two main departments of the Cabinet exert the greatest influence on defense planning, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The Minister of Defense has clearly been the dominant influence, in fact for eighteen of Israel's first twenty years of existence the prime minister served as his own defense minister. Although not based in

constitutional or legal foundation, a tradition was begun under Ben-Gurion whereby the minister of defense would concentrate on matters of grand strategy while the Israeli Defense Forces would deal with operational matters and the execution of policy.

Without a clear delineation of responsibilities a basic law passed in 1976 formally assigned command authority to the government. The minister of defense was given command over the IDF and was placed in direct line between the IDF and the Cabinet. The chief of staff of the IDF became responsible to the minister of defense for all matters. The minister of defense essentially has become the supreme commander of the Israeli Defense Forces and has the right to intervene at any level of the IDF. In spite of this the defense ministry restricts its primary concentration to technical and administrative matters (military research and development, production or procurement of material, and financial planning and budgeting). The IDF General Staff retains responsibility for organization, training and the planning and execution of military operations.

Early in the development of the State of Israel, a General Staff was formed, which is today known as the Zahal or Israeli Defense Force. State security is the concentration of the Jewish State. With unique threats to its survival such as being very small, an intruder among many larger enemy nations, the Israeli needs demanded a focus of all resources

at hand to match the threat. Any fragmentation of efforts could prove costly, even fatal. The organizational structure of the IDF is composed of a General Staff whose permanent members are the heads of five branches (operations, manpower, quartermaster, planning and intelligence); the commanders of the armored corps, navy and air force; and the three area commanders of the ground forces.⁵⁰

The General Staff has control over all IDF branches, and also exercises authority over more than twenty functional commands such as artillery, armor and training. The navy and air force are not considered separate services but do enjoy a fair degree of autonomy. The three ground force area commanders are assisted by a deputy and staff officers for supply, training, manpower and operations and have command over all installations and combat units in their sector of area defense.

This decentralization of command is responsible in large part for the autonomous operations and successes of the Israeli forces on the battlefield. General Andre Beaufre, one of France's leading strategic thinkers, pointed to "a large degree of decentralization of command, and ardent troops unencumbered by the complex of rigid and inhibited actions which still prevails all too often in the European

⁵⁰ Bard E. O'Neill, "The Defense Policy of Israel", cited in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, The Defense Policies of Nations, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) p. 393.

and American armies," as being prime contributors to Israeli successes.⁵¹ Israel's preoccupation with security guarantees is not diminished by civilian-control of the military nor threatened by potential use of militarism. It is important that the general staff concept can be civil controlled, flexible, can manage separate service branches and meet with modern battlefield successes.

2. United Kingdom

Even though possessing representative forms of government, the British and American governments differ on at least one fundamental aspect of the defense planning process. In the British parliamentary system the power of the executive and legislative branches are "fussed", in contrast to the American presidential system in which the power of the legislative and executive are "separated".⁵² In contrast to America's superpower status, Britain views its role as more than a mere regional actor, but in any realistic military assessment the country is a middle-rank European power below the Federal Republic of Germany and France.

Lacking major threats to its security, Britain is able to support a system of constructive adversary politics - the

⁵¹Nadav Safran, From War to War, (New York: Pegasus, 1969) p. 382.

⁵²Chris L. Jefferies, British Defense Policy: A Bibliographical Essay, cited in *ibid.*, Murray and Viotti, p. 228.

"whipping system"⁵³ - in its defense policy planning. Until very recently three service bureaucracies, attentive to its own traditions and priorities, competed for resources under central supervision but not effective central authority.⁵⁴ In 1964 a defense reorganization created a small coordinating defense ministry and three essentially autonomous service departments (Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry). This formed a centralized ministry of defence with a nominally strong central staff element and three subordinate single-service management organizations (navy, army and air force departments).⁵⁵ Later a procurement department was added. Individual departments operate under a loosely managed framework where service officials effectively protect their own projects and set their own priorities. Top appointed civilian officials exercise considerable guidance and control over policies and programs. The "fused" executive and legislative form of government results in an executive-led defense plan development process with the House of Commons and several of its committees maintaining a voice in the debate over primarily budget considerations. Outright rejection of a defense

⁵³Richard Burt, Defence Budgeting The British and American Cases, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers 112, 1975) p. 4.

⁵⁴David Greenwood, "The Defense Policy of the United Kingdom," cited in Ibid., Murray and Viotti, p. 197.

⁵⁵Ibid., Greenwood, p. 208.

proposal by the House of Commons essentially results in a call for reelection of the government.

3. France

France is a global middle power with substantial regional influence. It is the third-ranking world nuclear and naval power with impressive ground and air capabilities.⁵⁶ As a nation not directly threatened and seeking an independent role in world politics, France has developed a defense planning system designed primarily to self-guard the security of France without allied assistance. However, the planning system can accommodate joint military operations should a threat arise that cannot be handled by French forces.

Responsibility for defense matters is constitutionally and practically a matter of primary concern for the French president. The National Assembly, the legislative branch of government, lacks any real capacity for opposing executive branch defense proposals.

"The French (defense policy) process has much more in common with the centralized, secretive, executive-dominated British system...than with the pluralistic (American System).⁵⁷

Formulation of French defense policy is decidedly centralized, implementation of defense plans is not. The

⁵⁶Alan Ned Sabrosky, "The Defense Policy of France," cited in Ibid., Murray and Viotti, p. 231.

⁵⁷David S. Yost, "French Defense Budgeting: Persistent Constraints and Future Prospects," p. 35 as cited in Ibid., Murray and Viotti, p. 244.

structure of the French defense institution is very similar in organization to that of the United States. Implementation of the French defense plan is relegated to the General Secretariat of National Defense (much like the National Security Council of the US) and the ministry of National Defense (similar to the US Department of Defense). A chief of staff system has primary responsibility for the operation of the armed forces. Each individual service (army, navy, air force) has a chief of staff. The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff are headed by an armed forces chief of staff who has overall responsibility for the readiness of the French armed forces in peacetime. In wartime, he becomes Chief of the General Staff, with three service chiefs available as his deputies for specific operations.

G. CORPORATE STRATEGIC PLANNING

General Robert E. Wood, when chief executive of Sears, Roebuck and Company, said, "Business is like a war in one respect, if its grand strategy is correct, any number of tactical errors can be made and yet the enterprise proves successful."⁵⁸

Formal strategic planning first appeared in the business world in the mid-1950's. The new planning systems first only

⁵⁸A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structures: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1962) p. 235.

introduced long-range planning as a courier to planning for a given project. More and more firms began to tie their future estimates and decision criteria to five-year and one-year time frames.

The corporate strategic planning framework, in spite of vast motivation and objectives differences, offer a substantial array of useful applications to military strategic planning. The objective of corporate planning is tied to the maximization of profits. It is motivated by the increase, maintenance or minimization of loss of its share in the market place. Survival of the business enterprise is an objective of planning but there are alternatives to survival. Operations at a profit loss can be tolerated for a period of time in the business while capital improvements are made, external economy difficulties persist or while assets are shifted to profitable endeavors prior to disbanding the business interest. Complete failure of a corporation is for most, a temporary setback. For military strategic planning, any plan that might result in red ink on the military ledger is unacceptable. One underestimation, particularly in the nuclear age, can be fatal. Military planners are forced to operate under the motto that there is no alternative to survival.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ For an overall view of the developments that have taken place in the corporate business environment in strategic planning, the reader may find the following suggestions definitive and representative: Kenneth R. Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy, Irwin, 1980., Jay R. Galbraith

A disparity in planning systems produced by the difference in motivation of private (gain-seeking corporations) and public sector organizations can afford the luxury of testing various options, estimating needs and calculating projected costs and ultimately whether the corporation will continue to exist. A trial run for a new product line, a marketing technique or diversification can be made on a small scale to measure results and project larger scale outcomes, without jeopardizing the corporation or the marketplace. The invaluable feedback loop from suboptimized results to the planner for larger scale strategy is another advantage not often available to the military strategic planner.

First and foremost, the military planning process must operate, it cannot choose to stop. It is inconceivable that a nation willingly, deliberately would surrender its security requirements. Military strategic planning is directed primarily at the winning and preparing for war. Trial-runs of wartime operations can only be approximated by training exercises and simulations. No direct feedback relating

and Daniel A. Nathanson, Strategy Implementation: the role of structure and process, West, 1978., Charles W. Hofer and Dan Schendel, Strategy Formulation: Analytical Concepts, West, 1978., William R. King and David I. Cleland, Strategic Planning and Policy, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978., Ian C. MacMillan, Strategy Formulation: Political Concepts, West, 1978., Robert G. Murdick, et al., Business Policy, Grid, 1976., George A. Steiner, Strategic Planning, Free Press, 1979., H. Uytterhorven, et al., Strategy and Organization, Irwin 1977.

enemy responses is available to the military planner for modification or adaption of future plans to future needs.

Even with major ends and means differences between the private and public sector planning environments, certain correlations exist in the areas of the implementation, adaptation development of a planning system to the organization requirements. A variety of ways are espoused to accomplish strategic planning in the corporate world. The following typify the current approaches to methods of planning:

1. Committee - a committee process which involves the utilization of representative from various line and staff units throughout the organization to accomplish the planning. Experts from various parts of the organization assemble under the management appointed chairman but the responsibility for planning rests with the total committee membership. Since the committee will have broad organizational membership, a corporate view arises out of committee deliberations. No one corporate position is responsible for the results of the strategic planning.
2. Separate Staff Function - A separate staff function to accomplish strategic planning has several major drawbacks. If responsibility for strategic planning is left solely to the staff, line management will be cut out. Responsibility is given to a staff unit, even though it is staffed with very competent people and reports at a top management level, it will not produce the type of results the firm needs. A major area of uncertainty lies in having to make difficult judgements involving major allocations of scarce resources.
3. Line or Business Unit Management - Effective strategic planning should usually be accomplished by either line management or business unit management in large, diversified companies. Line management must be involved in this process to ensure both that the assumptions upon which these plans are built are reasonable and that the plans can be executed. Line management must make sure that the plan is eventually

carried out. There is no substitute for line management's accepting and supporting the planning process.

4. Top Management - Strategic planning is a top management responsibility. However, generally they should not be the only ones to engage in it.
5. Outside Consultant - Strategic planning in a firm can be aided by an outside consultant. Professional personnel who have seen a variety of systems can often provide very sound advice on experiences in similar situations. Using outside consultants to initially introduce strategic planning can be especially useful. Many times a firm will find it necessary to go outside the firm for consultants to deal with a particularly difficult problem of environmental analysis.
6. Task Force - When a problem of strategic consequence arises, a task force will be assembled.⁶⁰

Later discussions will center on the types of methods employed by the Navy in the past to meet its strategic planning needs. Certainly no single approach can adequately incorporate the myriad of variables in naval planning and produce a feasible, acceptable long-range plan. Differing planning requirements at various levels of naval command perhaps suggests that a combination of approaches is in order. Examining Navy planning requirements in light of the above corporate planning approaches may offer suggestions for modification of the Navy planning system or confirm the adequacy of the present system.

⁶⁰James B. Whittaker, Strategic Planning in a Rapidly Changing Environment, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1978) p. 9-13.

Basic assumptions of corporate strategic planning, apart from the aforementioned methodologies, may also prove applicable to Navy planning. One theme of the corporate world suggests that top management must be involved in order for planning to meet future goals. Taking into account the realization that top management, particularly in a large organization, cannot accomplish all the strategic planning that is required various strata of assistants will be a necessity. Delineation of each groups responsibility in this planning process can be crucial to the success of planning efforts. It is essential to the adaptation of a planning system to any organization that a comprehensive, honest analysis of the planning needs, assets, constraints of the organization be made to ensure that the system in use or projected is as closely matched to the requirements as is possible. This analysis can be performed using personnel within the organization or consultants contracted from outside the firm. After the installation of the suitable planning system, reexamination will be necessary periodically to ensure that the planning network is adjusting to a changing environment or to recommend modifications that would likely match demands.

Attempts to tailor any corporate strategic planning approaches to public or military planning must make accommodations for the size and complexity of the public sector. Differences between the two organizational entities are very

real. The dispersion of power across the entire population concentrated tenuously in the political leadership complicates the dimension of the governmental planning apparatus. Successful corporate strategies can undoubtedly not be transferred directly to public application; even transformation may not be suitable.

"In our democratic society, planning by government takes place within a political milieu. The separation of powers, checks and balances and periodic elections are key factors influencing the political environment. In a democratic political process, strategic planning tends to be much more open than it is in business, with many persons and groups involved. The results become much less predictable. When legislation is involved, for example, 435 members of the House of Representatives and 100 Senators potentially have a voice in the final decision. To a large extent, congressmen view legislative proposals from the point of view of their local constituents which may not always be optimum for the nation as a whole."⁶¹

Consensus-building and political adversity are magnified in the public sector and severely constrain efforts to reach widely acceptable agreements.

Applications of corporate strategies have been attempted in the public sector with varying degrees of success. Humphrey-Javits Bill introduced in 1975 sought to apply a proven business practice to government that of establishing detailed objectives in an overall comprehensive economic plan. The bill failed to pass and it is widely accepted that it

⁶¹Michael H. Moskow, Strategic Planning in Business and Government, (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1978) p. 26.

probably would not have been effective. Comments from the private sector point to lessons learned in the past by the business world could have forestalled its failure.

1. Recognition that strong commitment accross the spectrum is required.
2. Changes must be gradual
3. Top management must have a clear understanding of the purposes of the system and how it is to be implemented.
4. "great care should be taken to insure that concern over techniques does not divert planners and managers from the fundamental purposes of planning. If this is not done, the manipulation of numbers becomes more important than their meaning. Formal procedures and rituals drive out the creativity, innovation and imagination needed for effective planning. Although this course is not inevitable, it has been followed by government PPB systems in the past."⁶²

Reviewing the path already followed by corporate management in devising strategic systems, even though operating on a much smaller, less complex scale than to structure the problem and identify pitfalls than the direct application of methods. Both organizations suffer from personal turnovers, but business can minimize its effects when personnel shift within the company rather than having a major turnover as the government does periodically. Both the public and private sectors with divisions of labor in strategic planning is the responsibility of top leadership. But since assistance is required to meet planning needs it becomes important where the limits of responsibility between decision-maker and staff are established.

⁶²George A. Steiner, Strategic Planning, (New York: The Free Press Inc., 1979) p. 331-332.

A clarifying caution witnessed in the corporate world may be enlightening:

"The planning staff must play only a substantive; facilitative role in providing forecasts, assumptions, alternative strategies, etc., to be considered by the manager-planners. If they try to play the planning cultural role of the chief executive, they may well be viewed as "technocrats with a cause." Then they, like the efficiency experts, operations researchers, and host of others before them, will be relegated to the back room of the organization, and their cause will not play a significant role in determining the organization's destiny."⁶³

Another, though certainly not the last useful application of corporate knowledge to the public sector, is a forewarning about the pace at which changes should be made. Experiences in the corporate world reveal that the precepts of strategic planning are difficult to translate into practice.

"Not only is the translation difficult, but attempts to install rigorous strategic discipline typically run into 'resistance to planning' - an organizational 'enertia' - commonly referred to as an anti-planning bias."⁶⁴

Once an organizational agreement is reached that a need for strategic planning exists and a proposed strategic planning system is accepted, the pace of implementation of the system should be measured and accommodating. Knowledgeable management strategists recommend, 'make haste slowly.'

⁶³David I. Cleland and William R. King, Strategic Planning and Policy, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1978) p. 284.

⁶⁴Igor H. Ansoff, Roger P. Declerck and Robert L. Hayes, From Strategic Management, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976) p. 39-40.

III. AMERICAN NAVAL STRATEGIC PLANNING

In order to move forward with a proposal for a change (improvements) in the Navy's strategic planning it is incumbent upon those who would propose a change to have first measured the modification against past efforts. To suggest a change to an existing system should not be judged as a criticism of that system. The Navy's history reveals an unfailing service to the nation. It has more than met its obligations and has been prepared for any response when called. The Navy's planning system has worked well in the past and continues to work very well today. If a suggestion for minor changes can produce any improvements in the effectiveness of the system then any effort toward that end is worthwhile.

A. THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

The U.S. Navy was founded on October 13, 1775. For the next eighty years it was engaged in naval operations but the United States remained relatively safe from invasion and occupied itself primarily with the consolidation and development of its vast western land masses.⁶⁵

⁶⁵William Crowe, "Western Strategy and Naval Missions Approaching the Twenty First Century," ed. James L. George, Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978) p. 14.

Naval matters of the fledgling United States of America were handled by the Secretary of War until 27 April, 1798, when the creation of the Department of the Navy was authorized.⁶⁶ It began to operate at Philadelphia under Benjamin Stoddert. The Navy had one ship at sea and three under construction. Secretary Stoddert could count on both hands the total personnel and ships of the Department of the Navy.

"This was the static eighteenth century when naval warfare, both in methods and in instruments, remained virtually unchanged generation after generation. If a warship's wooden hull remained sound, she stayed in service 40, or even 60 years, just about as good as the latest product of the shipyards. Not only from year to year, but also from nation to nation, the static uniformity prevailed; a captured vessel could be instantly absorbed into a fleet with none of today's technical complications. The constructors and taxpayers had it easier also, a still sound ship did not have to be replaced with a bigger and better one made obsolescent in international competition by technical innovations. The unchanging methods of handling ships and fighting them, likewise, made it more comfortable for those who commanded and manned them; what one learned as a midshipman still held good when one became a captain or an admiral. A further factor that made administration easy was the similarity between warships and merchantmen. In hulls, masts, sails and rigging, the smaller warships differed little from the larger trading vessels, which carried guns too, allowing quick conversion for war purposes."⁶⁷

Primarily concerned with "showing the flat" the newly formed Navy, however, found itself engaged in war ten of its first seventeen years. The infant Navy distinguished itself

⁶⁶Frost H. Holloway, History of the Modern United States Navy, (Annapolis, MD.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1929) p. 128.

⁶⁷Robert Greenhalgh Albion, Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1947, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980) p. 4.

against the French in the guasi war (1798-1801) and in the Barbary Wars (1801-1805). However, it was unable to handle the British fleet in 1812. Often the Navy found itself serving as an extension of the Department of State when in foreign ports. Administrative and logistic functions remained simple until the need for coal demanded wide-ranging port and outlet arrangements.

1. The Bureau System

Strong administrative leadership, knowledgeable in Naval affairs was becoming more a necessity. Just one week before peace was made with Britain, Congress created a "Board of Navy Commissioners, "commonly called the Navy Board. Professional Naval officers were, for the first time, given a share of the administrative responsibility of the Navy. The next century and a half would witness adjustments to the balance between ultimate civilian authority and professional military experience. Major incremental changes in this adjustment process occurred in two pairs of dates just a century apart, 1815 and 1842, and 1915 and 1942. The settlement in 1815 was interpreted by Secretary Benjamin W. Crowninshield such that he retained "military" functions of operations and personnel with the professional military limited to "civil material and logistical functions." This arrangement would plague the Navy for years but matters were made even worse by the Board's attempt to collectively handle all business even to the minute. Responsibility for any

naval discrepancy could not be traced to any Board member resulting in a criticism of "what was everybody's business became nobody's business."⁶⁸

Some relief from this situation was realized in 1842 by the creation of the bureau system. Patterned by Congress after the War Department system, the bureau system became a valuable and permanent addition to the naval establishment. The original bureaus of 1842 were Yards and Docks, Ordnance, Construction and Repair, Medicine and Surgery, and Provisions and Clothing. In 1862, the bureaus of Navigation (later Naval Personnel), (Steam) Engineering and Equipment were added. In 1921, Aeronautics was added; in 1940, Construction and Repair merged with Engineering to become the Bureau of Ships.

The matter of civilian control by secretaries who lack naval experience and knowledge worsened after 1818. Prior to this time attempts were made to appoint secretaries who at least superficially had some connection with shipping, however, Cabinet posts much as diplomatic assignments became part of the spoils system. This coupled with Secretary Crowninshield's action of 1815 whereby responsibility for operational control - the making of war plans and the "calling

⁶⁸ For a personal account of service both on the General Board and within the Bureau system consult, Seaton Schroeder, A Half Century of Naval Service, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1922) p. 270-277.

of signals" when war came - remained in the hands of inexperienced civilian secretaries. This untenable arrangement would remain until 1915.

As the bureau system was being implemented, the "naval revolution," transition from wood and sail to steel and steam was getting underway.⁶⁹ Engine technology eclipsed Navy capabilities and private industry became the main supplier of engines, while Navy yards still produced hulls. Steam warships ushered in a period of greater complexity; not only could the Navy not build steam engines, but its officers did not know how to operate and repair them. Besides overseas refueling bases and other logistics problems, steam raised the question of strategic cruising radius since warships could not remain at sea indefinitely as in sailing days. Specialization became more and more imbedded in the Navy fabric.

Foundations for a full-dress battle fleet were laid in 1890, as the Navy shifted from its dependence on coast-defense vessels. The Navy helped to make the United States a world power in 1898 by defeating the Spanish squadrons in a colonial war. Prestige for the Navy increased along with increase in its size and number of warships but under its awkward system of management it was characterized as "being well-organized for everything except war." Several efforts

⁶⁹Fletcher Pratt, The Compact History of the United States Navy, (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1962) p. 110-111.

were made to establish a board of line officers to give professional direction to the planning and control of naval operations, but none survived Congress. Fear of total military control was a factor in the proposal's failure to pass.

2. Ad Hoc Planning

Over the short history of the U.S. Navy, it had not established a professional military advisory group capable of advising its civilian secretaries during wartime. During the War of 1812, Navy Secretary William Jones found the Navy Department to be unprepared for strategic planning and the effective direction of wartime operations. He sought ad hoc advice from individual naval officers which resulted in conflicting opinions and ships departing port without definite sailing directions.⁷⁰ Later in the war, Secretary Jones reported:

"The multifarious concerns of the naval establishment, the absence of whole regulations in its civil administration, and the imperfect execution of duties due to want of professional experience, lead to confusion and abuse."⁷¹

Again when the United States was enmeshed in the Civil War the only professional inputs to decisions concerning the

⁷⁰ Edwin B. Hooper, The Navy Department: Evolution and Fragmentation, (Washington D.C.: The Naval Historical Foundation, 1978) p. 4.

⁷¹ John D. Long, The New American Navy, (New York: The Outlook Co., 1903) Vol. I, p. 101.

employment of naval forces were in the form of ad hoc advice.⁷² A tradition of sorts was begun during the Spanish-American War by the establishment of a Board of Strategy. The Board, which included Alfred Thayer Mahan as a member, was set up to advise the Navy Secretary on the conduct of operations. The Board was an ad hoc approach to professional military advice to decision-makers during the war. This trend has continued where planning processes during peace time are found to be unsuitable for wartime. Therefore, at the crucial juncture where war preparation continues but intensifies to war fighting, a reorganization of the planning procedure is begun.

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the first major effort by the Navy to establish a more long-range view of its planning requirements. On 13 March, 1900, the General Board was created by General Order 544.⁷³ Its purpose was to advise the Secretary of the Navy on what was necessary to "insure the efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war and for the naval defense of the coast." For the first fifteen years of its existence the Board was involved in originating and coordinating nearly all planning in the Navy. The Board was primarily concerned with reviewing war and defense planning done at the Naval War College,

⁷³ The Navy Department, A Brief History Until 1945,
(Washington, D.C.: The Naval Historical Foundation, 1970)
p. 8.

planning the location of naval bases and determining the number, kind, disposition and military characteristics of ships. Even though its duties were purely advisory in nature, the Board under Admiral of the Navy George Dewey generated the policies and guidance for overall ship building programs for the next five years. The building plans were not fully implemented but did produce a blueprint for future plans.

As the world status of America and the complexity of military coordination grew a requirement for joint Army and Navy planning became apparent. In July 1903, the Joint Army-Navy Board was established.⁷⁴ A forerunner of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Army-Navy Board coordinated the preparation of the famous "color" plans which served as the basis of American strategy through the late 1930s by melding the inputs from the Navy Board and Army General Staff. When the post of Chief of Naval Operations was created, responsibility for the preparation of war plans shifted to the CNO's staff - OpNav. The Navy Board continued to review war plans and advised the Secretary of the Navy as requested.

The drive for more effective overall line control continued and in 1915 Congress created the post of the Chief of Naval Operations. Sponsors of the change foresaw real

⁷⁴ Jack D. Nicholas, George B. Pickett, and William O. Spears Jr., The Joint and Combined Staff Officer's Manual, (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1959) p. 2.

powers of direction, but the combination of a strong Secretary of the Navy and a less forceful first CNO meant that initial expectations would not be met. A year later, Congress added an Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (referred to as OpNav). With a wide range of functions concentrated under OpNav, improvements in the systematic planning and coordinating service were evident. However, yet to be resolved was the lack of direct control of the CNO over fleet operational commands nor any direct authority over bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.

During the first thirty-two years of its existence the Navy Board essentially served as the high command of the Navy. The Director of Naval Intelligence, the President of the Naval War College and from 1915 to 1932 the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps served as official members of the Navy Board. Because its membership consisted of the senior uniformed policy makers, the Navy Board generated great influence and authority by its policy statements in spite of its advisory nature. This advisory channel resulted from the release of Board members from administrative and operational duties, but still lacking was any executive authority. In 1932, all official members of the Navy Board were removed and the Board suffered a loss in its authority. Reestablished with its membership composed of three to five Rear Admirals, one or more Captains and a Commander as executive secretary, the Navy Board continued to contribute

significantly as an advisory group to the Secretary of the Navy until 1945.

During the interwar years the Navy Board developed all of the yearly building programs and reviewed the characteristics of all new warships and support units. With the exception of a review cycle in the development of major war plans, particularly war plan ORANGE against Japan, the Navy Board concentrated on position papers regarding Naval mobilization, ship and aircraft innovations, arms limitations agreements of the 1920's and 1930's. The Board was the primary contributor to the Two Ocean Navy Building Program of 1929-1940. With emphasis on force composition rather than employment and deployment and strategic operational aspects, the Board remained an advisory service to the Secretary of the Navy and less an integral part of the operational Navy planning system.

Several external constraints, namely arms limitations agreements, tight Navy budgets and fears of an approaching global war resulted in a major drawback of the Board, limited long-range view of planning. Its relatively limited time horizons restricted projections to less than a decade into the future. In spite of this, the Board generated what was to become far more coherent and effective guidance for Naval forces and strategies than would be witnessed in the postwar years. The Navy maintained control of its own budget through 1947 which greatly facilitated the Navy's control over its

own force composition and strategic direction. After the loss of management authority of its own funds, the Navy has seen an increased hampering of its long-range planning. That is not likely to change. Annual budget review cycles effectively shunt any long-term perspective to planning. Adherence to or development of a viable long-range strategy which is specific enough to be useful is almost precluded by being at the mercy of budget cycles, executive branch turnovers and congressional shifts.

3. Planning Reorganization for War

Again war brought about another very significant change to the naval establishment. In March, 1942, "a fundamental step resulted in the greatest concentration of military authority in the history of the Navy Department."⁷⁵ Admiral Ernest J. King was appointed Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet with his headquarters not on a distant flagship but in the Navy Department Building. This combined operational command as Commander in Chief with the departmental control of the Chief of Naval Operations post.⁷⁶ Controlling two separate staffs, Admiral King personified responsibility in the military arena.⁷⁷ The power and influence of the General Board diminished considerably as the shift in emphasis of

⁷⁵Ibid., Albion, p. 17.

⁷⁶Ibid., Hooper, p. 14-15.

⁷⁷A detailed view of the division of responsibility and individuals serving in leadership positions in the reorganized

of planning was subsumed to war fighting objective under Admiral King.

With the increase in authority gained by the new position came the establishment of different channels of communication between the military and civilian leadership. In his role as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King was responsible directly to the Secretary of the Navy. As the Commander in Chief of the US Fleet he was responsible directly to the President and in general to the Secretary. Overall, strategic military direction of the war was maintained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, composed of Admiral King, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces and Admiral William D. Leahy in the new post of Chief of Staff to the President as Commander in Chief.

Postwar planning for the Navy was conducted by a special section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The special planning section was tasked with identifying the underlying assessments of future requirements and objectives as well as a plan for a force structure to meet the objectives. The postwar planning group only functioned from 1943 through 1945. Its task was taken over in November 1945 by the various planning divisions created by the reorganization

Navy system and its influence on postwar planning consult, Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966) p. 5-7.

of OPNAV.⁷⁸ Under the Chief of Naval Operations, several deputy CNO divisions assumed responsibility for plans involving their particular divisions. Among the more prominent planning divisions were the DCNO (Operations) (OP-03) and his Strategic Plans Division (OP-30), the DCNO (Logistics) (OP-04) and his Logistics Plans Division (OP-40), and the DCNO (Air) (OP-05) with his Aviation Plans Division (OP-50).

By this time, however, the impact of the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942 was being felt by the Navy. Navy plans became subject to the guidance of higher military council. Even though the Navy did not submit its plans to the JCS for review and approval, as the Army did, the assumptions of the roles and missions upon which the Navy's postwar plans were based came under attack by the JCS. Arguments generated by the individual services views of its postwar missions were to result in major changes to the military structure of the United States.⁷⁹ So conflictual in fact were the views that the postwar plans developed in OPNAV proved to be influential for less than two years.

Sweeping changes brought about the creation of the National Military Establishment of 1947 permanently altered the Navy's way of conducting its affairs. For the first time

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This transition in the planning responsibility is very well documented in Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the United States Navy, 1943-1946, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

⁷⁹Ibid., Pratt, p. 322-323.

Navy planners were required to submit their input to a joint Army-Navy budget proposal, which further intensified the interservice rivalry. The particulars surrounding the points of contention between the services is outside the scope of this study. Very briefly, though, the roles and missions controversy primarily involved the delineation of responsibilities for aviation units of the Army Air Forces and the Navy. Before the separation of the Army and its Air Force component was determined, the Army and Navy had both made their respective postwar force assessments, requirements and plans without any collaboration or correlation of efforts between the two services. Adding a third competing service to the military arena only complicated the issues. Unification of the services under one Secretary and Department of Defense was seen as a way of coordinating the military resources of the nation. Unification further restricted the Navy's autonomy by reducing its immediate civilian authority from a Cabinet rank to an understudy of the Secretary of Defense.

The fiscal austerity policies of the Truman Administration combined with the continuing controversy over roles and missions,⁸⁰ essentially reduced Navy postwar plans to the

⁸⁰Herman S. Wouk, "Independence and Responsibility: USAF in the Defense Establishment," and Robert W. Coakley, "The Army Since Unification: An Old Institution in a New Environment," ed. Paul R. Schratz, Evolution of the American Military Establishment Since World War II, (Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation Publication, 1978) p. 40-41 and 60-61.

point of being meaningless. "Long-range planning by all the services was nearly non-existent at this time. Estimates were provided regularly with respect to the long-term impact of such new technology as the atomic bomb and the guided missile, and long-range geopolitical forecasts were also prepared on a sporadic basis by both the services and the Joint Chiefs. Two long-range war plans were undertaken by the JCS as well: CHARTIOTEER in 1947 and DROPSHOT in 1948-49. Neither was approved as a basis for long-term force planning, although Navy efforts to develop force structures for 1955 were prepared in connection with the CHARTIOTEER plan.⁸¹

The period of fiscal austerity between 1947 and 1950 was followed by expansion in the defense budget from 1951-1954 as force levels were rising to meet the demands of the Korean War and the heightened Cold War. Navy plans for this rearmament were developed during 1950 and reflected an effort to meet immediate needs based on emergency situations over the next four years. Planning for a four year period was made possible by the formalization of the global fears expressed in NSC 68/4 of December 1950. "No long-range planning organization existed in the United States Navy during this time."⁸² The possible urgings of CNO, Admiral

⁸¹The Maritime Balance Study, The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 April, 1979) p. A-4.

⁸²Ibid., p. A-5.

Forrest Sherman, prompted the Secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews, to abolish the General Board in 1951.

The only Navy originated long-range planning endeavor of the early 1950's was a set of strategic estimates prepared in the Strategic Studies Branch of OP-30. That branch was established in 1952 by the new Director of the Strategic Plans Division, Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke. In that same year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff implemented a program which called for the preparation of a five-year Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP) and a fifteen-year Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE). The JSOP, in particular, provided a blueprint for force level planning for all services and delineated the bounds within which the Navy's future was plotted.

As the Korean War wound down the Eisenhower Administration reinstated a program of economy in the national defense budget. Though constrained by budget limitations the Navy was allowed the autonomy to establish its own force composition. In 1954, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, created an ad hoc committee which in 1955, produced the Navy's first independent, workable plan for the long-term maintenance of its force levels since World War II. The committee was titled the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Long Range Shipbuilding Plans and Programs and was chaired by Vice Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie. It was charged with preparing a study that would: "crystallize thinking on the nature of future naval operations sufficiently to provide a firm basis

for annual shipbuilding programs. Long-range strategic concepts and prospective technical developments are indicated as among the factors likely to determine the nature of future naval warfare."⁸³

Three study groups were established to provide dates in support of the Navy's first examination of its task force composition since World War II. One group was to analyze the capabilities and responsibilities of Naval Striking Forces, carrier task forces, including antisubmarine, convoy and escort forces, and amphibious forces. The Strategic Plans Division (OP-60) was requested to provide a strategic estimate of military tasks and Navy responsibilities for the future. The Chief of Naval Research was requested to assess the technological state-of-the-art practicably achievable in various fields over the next ten to fifteen years by the United States, its allies and its prospective enemies, while a civilian staff member was to develop the general study plan, lay out the tasks to be performed and advise Admiral Ofstie. Captain (Rear Admiral selectee) Charles D. Griffin was assigned by his old shipmate Admiral Arleigh Burke to coordinate the work of the study groups and prepare the overall report,

⁸³ Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, (Washington D.C.: Naval Research Advisory Committee, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Engineering and Systems), 1979) p. 31-32.

Admiral Griffin was the only member of the study team to work full time on the study.

Twenty months were required to complete the report and some very important projections of shipbuilding requirements, nuclear propulsion and equipment conversions were presented for the Navy of the future. Perhaps equally important was an assessment of the U.S. military posture from 1960 to 1970. In terms of its present-day Navy the final report produced a significant statement of Navy philosophy, it summarized current Navy thinking and plotted a course for the Navy of the future. Based on less than optimistic assessments of growing Soviet military strength, increasing American vulnerabilities and the Navy's capability to meet increasing security demands, the shipbuilding and force objectives outline proved to be very ambitious. Economically, the study was very near its targets estimating level 2 billion per year for shipbuilding. Technologically, however, the study called for the adoption and incorporation of new technological advancements that proved to be beyond feasible limits.

Even though the study provided a realistic estimate of the Navy's future and the minimum requirements necessary to meet projected needs it was in fact, just a beginning. "...the shipbuilding proposals put forward were more an amalgamation of projects favored by the various committee members and their offices than a fully coordinated and focused plan. Even the committee recognized that the report primarily would

serve as an effective starting point for continuous review and revision. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, accepted this reservation as well, and while he approved the report for planning purposes, he noted that the long-range objectives it proposed would be considered only where appropriate in mid-range and annual programs.⁸⁴ Annual review and revision of the long-range projections would become the task of the Long Range Objectives Group (OP-93).

This committee's success prompted the establishment of OP-93, the Long Range Objectives Group which began functioning in 1956. OP-93 was responsible for the bulk of the Navy's long-range planning through the 1960's.

The Long Range Objectives Group was tasked with advising the Chief of Naval Operations on developments over the next fifteen years in technology, strategy, and the Navy's requirements and the methods and weapons necessary to meet those capabilities. It was to generate the overall Navy strategic concepts and devise the plan and optimum weapons mix to fulfill its future role.

"In addition to preparing its own studies, OP-93 was to enlist the assistance of scientists and other experts on

⁸⁴Chief of Naval Operations to Chairman, Standing Committee, Long Range Shipbuilding and Conversion Plan, Serial 0019P93, 3 March 1956, Technical Reference Room Microfilm Collection, Center for Naval Analysis. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 37-38.

permanent study groups or special projects. Its central task was to prepare an integrated annual statement of Navy guidelines and priorities for force levels, weapons development, and the introduction of new strategic applications and warfare techniques. It was to be located in the Pentagon, directed by a Rear Admiral, and staffed by three Captains, one Marine Colonel, one Navy Lieutenant, a civilian scientist, plus the four to seven civilian analysts in its associated Naval Warfare Analysis Group (NAVWAG). The Long Range Objectives Group was expected to serve as the equivalent of a Navy Rand Corporation, and NAVWAG did perform an operations research function similar to that of its Air Force counterpart."⁸⁵

Admiral Burke remembered well the uncertainties which plague long-range planners from his experiences in the General Board and in the Strategic Plans Division. Just as importantly he recognized the need for long-range planning and set about organizing OP-93 and staffing it with the brightest officers available. The first four directors between 1955 and 1963, Charles D. Griffin, Roy L. Johnson, Horacio Rivero and Thomas H. Moorer, all achieved four star rank, Admiral Moorer became CNO and Admiral Rivero reached Vice CNO.

The most important task of OP-93 was the production of an annual Long Range Objectives Statement (LRO). The

⁸⁵Ibid., Maritime Balance Study, p. A-9.

second LRO in 1958 became the first official Navy document to establish a plan for a true long-range force level --- the fleet ballistic missile submarine (forty as compared to the six in production). Again the significance attached to a long-range plan resulted from the exigency of an external threatening situation; it was a response to Soviet development of an ICBM. The LRO of 1958, a very significant Navy statement entitled "The Navy of the 1970 Era" was ultimately the only OP-93 document to be signed off by the CNO to the Secretary of the Navy as a recommendation for future planning and shipbuilding programs.⁸⁶ A supplemental statement to the LRO from OP-93 was called for by Admiral Burke, the Long Range Requirements Study (LRR). It was established to formulate internal policy and force level goals and define the course for Navy research and development. Only produced once in 1960, the LRR-60 project was deemed nearly useless since it did not take into account any funding limitations. The LRO continued to serve as the first step in planning guidance for mid-range plans and as a general guideline for the preparation of annual shipbuilding and procurement programs. Reduced to

⁸⁶The LRO of 1958, a very significant Navy statement entitled "The Navy of the 1970 Era" was ultimately the only OP-93 document to be signed off by the CNO to the Secretary of the Navy as a recommendation for future planning and shipbuilding programs. Ibid., Historical perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 46-47.

the "secret" classification the LRO could be distributed to fleet users and it became a more realistic projection by the infusion of fleet comments and assistance in the planning process.⁸⁷

4. McNamara Era

Major reorganization efforts became necessary for the Navy's planning process to accommodate the detailed analysis of Secretary of Defense McNamara's budget programs. Introduction of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and the institution of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) required greater attention to in-depth analysis and time-conscious precision than could be expected by the long-range study group approach. In October 1963, the Long-Range Objectives Group was shifted to the newly established Office of Navy Program Planning (OP-090) from its more prominent position within the immediate office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Rather than reporting to the Vice CNO the director of OP-93 now reported to the director of OP-090. The Naval Warfare Advisory Group was moved to OP-91, the Division of Naval Warfare Analysis.

Soon after the reorganization the LRO became the MRO, the Mid-Range Objectives Statement. The MRO was not intended

⁸⁷ Chief of Naval Operations to the Distribution List, Subject: Long Range Studies, Serial 18P93, 17 February 1949, in Folder "5400, Long Range Planning Studies Project, "Naval War College Central Files, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 48.

a definition of naval responsibilities nor point out the strategic or policy implications of weapons systems under development as the LRO was intended to do. The MRO lost the conceptual approach of the LRO and became an estimate of the number and type forces which could procure and operate within defined fiscal limits. The MRO lowered the time horizon from fifteen in LRO to eleven years. Beginning in the mid-1960's the broader concerns of strategy and policy, formerly a task of OP-93 became the responsibility of the Navy Strategic Study (NSS) prepared by the DCNO (Plans and Policy) (OP-06). This new arrangement proved to be better suited to the integration of the shorter range MRO planning programs than the longer range system of the 1950's, but the improvement may have been superficial. Forced to function in the departmental structure, far removed from the seat of decision-making, long-term policy formulation took a noticeable fall from prominence after the Vietnam War began.

B. CONCEPTUAL AND FUNCTIONAL PLANNING

A new division within the scope of planning surfaced in the mid-1960's. A differentiation between conceptual and functional planning became evident throughout the Department of Defense, exemplified in the Navy by the LRO and MRO statements.

"Conceptual plans may be defined as broadly conceived studies, concerned with identifying long-term goals by examining unstructured and irregular data from

both inside and outside the Navy, and combining geo-political, technological and economic factors. Functional planning, on the other hand, is much more narrow and structured. Concerned with programming objectives, it has been identified primarily with the PPBS system, and is based largely on internally generated data and conducted in accordance with regular procedures and timetables.⁸⁸

Fewer study groups surfaced within the Navy department with instructions to provide longer range conceptual guidance than study groups designed to generate and analyze empirical data.

In August 1969, OP-93 submitted its last objectives statement. Its value to the Navy can only be assumed but it served as the basis for the Navy's response to National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM)50 on the status and future of U. S. naval forces.⁸⁹

After the disestablishment of OP-93 in September 1970, its director Rear Admiral Roy G. Anderson became the director of OP-96 the Systems Analysis Division. The subdivision OP-96L staffed by three Navy Captains, one Marine Colonel and one civilian GS-17, assumed the long-range planning duties previously assigned to OP-93. Further reductions in

⁸⁸ Ibid., Historical Perspectives of Long Range Planning in the Navy, p. 58.

⁸⁹ United States Long Range Objectives, LRO-81, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, August 1969, copy received from OP-965, Extended Planning branch, Systems Analysis Division. Cited in Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 55.

the emphasis long-range planning came in August 1971, when Rear Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of OP-96 recommended that the production of annual Long Range Objective statements be discontinued. He contended that the LRO had been reduced to little more than a formality and that the information which was to be conveyed to the CNO was available to him from many other sources. OP-96L was redesignated as OP-965 and assumed the role believed by Admiral Turner to have been the original function of the Long Range Objectives Group. That original function was to "select and analyze specific problems affecting the Navy and developing objectives for solving those problems in the future." By 1978 the size and influence of OP-965 was reflected by its staff, four officers, the highest rank being a Commander. Neither LRO nor MRO statements were continued and OP-965 became responsible for production of the Extended Planning Annex (EPA) to the Navy Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and the CNO Planning and Programming Guidance (CPPG).⁹⁰

Consistent long-range naval planning was not a major focus during the 1960's and 1970's. External pressure from the Secretary of Defense for system analysis approaches to efficiency reduced planning to estimates of near term force

⁹⁰ Stansfield Turner to Director, Navy Program Planning, Serial 805P96, 13 August 1971, Subject: Future Status of the Long Range Planning Document, OP-965 files. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 59.

Consistent long-range naval planning was not a major focus during the 1960's and 1970's. External pressure from the Secretary of Defense for system analysis approaches to efficiency reduced planning to estimates of near term force levels, requirements, and associated operations and procurement fiscal demands. Very little meaningful long-range planning has occurred during a crisis or wartime situation; Vietnam was no exception. Short-term exigencies act as blinders to further ranging plan development. Additionally, the reduction on overall military influence to decision-making and the loss of access by long-range planners to executive councils greatly diluted any conceptual strategic innovations. Several short-term - five to ten years - studies were conducted within the Navy Department, Major Fleet Escort Study '67, Sea Mix I, II and III and the Navy Mission Effectiveness Study of the mid-70's, but none impacted Naval strategy or operations.

1. Project 2000

Although largely conducted outside the normal Navy planning system, Project 60 initiated by CNO Admiral Zumwalt, 1970-1974 could be categorized as a form of conceptual planning. It was designed to provide the CNO and the Navy a comprehensive plan for guidance during the CNO's tenure for shipbuilding, manpower and modernization developments. A logical follow-on study report was compiled toward the end of Admiral Zumwalt's tour called, Project 2000. The three volume report was

unique in several respects. It combined Navy and contractor data into a plan designed to layout a naval plan for what kind of Navy would be necessary in the year 2000 rather than the size of force levels and specific types of weapons. First building a perception of the political, economic, international, resource and military milieu that would likely exist in the year 2000 and planning backward to the 1970's, it was hoped that efforts would be initiated to provide for the future requirements. Project 2000 was cancelled in 1977 without update or replacement.⁹¹

Admiral Zumwalt, perhaps unknowingly, ushered in a trend of CNO's channeling their long-range strategic concerns to ad hoc, personally supervised study groups. His feeling of the reduction in prestige and influence of the Office of the Chief Naval Operations as a result of greater civilianized centralization, substantially impeded the Navy's development of its own long-range strategic plans. Admiral Zumwalt reflected his doubts that the power remaining in the Office of the CNO was sufficient to sustain an institutionalized formal long-range planning system of any real value in opening comments to a draft of the Project 2000 report:

"There has been a steady diminution of the power of Chiefs of Naval Operations over the years. As the Pentagon has become increasingly centralized, a by product of this centralization has been a steady

⁹¹Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch, (New York: The New York Times Book Co., 1976) p. 66-84.

deterioration in any real payoff for long-range planning in the Navy in a bureaucratic sense. This erosion has also driven the long-range planning process to be useful only to the CNO in his personal capacity in dealing with a centralized Pentagon and in meetings with the JCS, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense, the President and Congressional Committees.⁹²

By mid-1979, a new trend for Navy Planning had emerged, a further splintering of the system responsible for long-range conceptual planning. The work of OP-965 continues to support the Extended Planning Annex, and the CNO Planning and Programming Guidance, even though manning remains at a very low level. The Strategic Plans Division still submits the Navy Strategic Study but only occasionally, much as the Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate to which it is linked. The new approach to planning results from warfare specialty or platform sponsor divisions within OPNAV; primarily from the DCNO (Submarine Warfare) (OP-02), the DCNO (Surface Warfare) (OP-03), and the DCNO (Air Warfare) (OP-05). Following the lead of OP-03 in 1973 each DCNO now promulgates a Warfare Master Plan.

These plans are updated annually, and provide input to the POM, the CPPG and the EPA. This further fragmentation and interest-oriented approach to planning cannot heighten Navy sights for longer range planning.

⁹²Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Admiral USN (Ret), letter to David A. Rosenberg, 23 November 1979. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 62.

2. Evaluations of Navy Study Groups

A few observations had conclusions from the 1973 Beamont Study, the Maritime Balance Study and the exhaustive survey the "Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy", can serve as a summary of the Navy's current planning status and offer recommendations for structuring an improvement to the system. The Beamont Study⁹³ relates three specific areas of concern for the future of Navy planning:

"a broader and longer range view of the world is greatly needed. First, the Navy must consider social, economic and political developments that will affect it as a military institution. Second, military doctrine must be considered against the background of changing technological and strategic developments and assessments of the future. Third, these changes must be considered in terms of the lead time needed for both hardware and manpower planning."⁹⁴

Even though no proposal was forthcoming, a recommendation was expressed for a segregation of present-day short term operational decisions from planning. Also suggested was an emphasis on planning as being a vital process in the Navy not a secondary or collateral concern. Most recommendations of the Beamont Study were viewed as impossible to implement given existing departmental constraints.

⁹³The Beamont Study is a contractor's study of "major Organizational considerations for the Chief of Naval Operations," The document is not accessible through normal governmental distribution channels.

⁹⁴Organizational Resources Counselors, Inc., Major Organizational Considerations for the Chief of Naval Operations, Vol. 1-Reports, May 1973, p. VIII-24-VIII-32.

The observations relayed in the "Historical Perspectives of Long Range Planning in the Navy" suggest that long-range planning of any great value in the Navy just might be a near impossibility, given current organizational framework. The report's prime researcher Dr. David A. Rosenberg offers the following indicators: there was no truly systemic process for doing long-range planning in the U.S. Navy since 1945 for the following reasons:

1. The most obvious is that long-range planning is an extremely difficult undertaking, filled with myriad uncertainties that defy accurate prediction and thus hinder any true integrated future planning.
2. Contentment with force levels through the early 1960s, complicated by urgent requirements of accelerated Polaris development and Vietnam prevented any long-term strategy.
3. Due to the Navy's internal structure, a systematic long-range planning process could not be developed. The Navy is a complex amalgam of different internal interest groups dating back to the controversy between line and engineering officers in 1860. The ascendancy of aviation and submarine specialization hampers the "One Navy" concept. Weighing and redressing the needs of distinctly different warfare fields is difficult.
4. The unpredictability of overall defense budgets and particularly the Navy's apportionment make realistic long-range projections impossible. Dr. Rosenberg raises an intriguing question: Did organizational changes within the Department of Defense inhibit long-range planning in the Navy? The obvious answer, especially as it relates to the early stages after reorganization, is yes reorganization did inhibit Navy planning. The most important aspect of the question is whether or not the Navy could better have adapted to the organization. A single answer is difficult to arrive at, but a partial answer will be formulated later.

5. A final observation calls for an assessment of the impact on long-range planning that resulted from the role of individual policy makers. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Admirals Burke, Zumwalt and Rickover are offered for consideration.⁹⁵

Some conclusions and recommendations from the committee report on the "Maritime Balance Study, The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment" can be joined with lessons relegated above to form a proposal for improvements in the Navy planning system.

1. As of early 1979, there was no centralized organization within either the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Office of the Secretary of the Navy capable of performing and integrating conceptual and functional long-range planning and that historical evidence indicates that there is a need for the reestablishment of such an organization.
2. In order for a planning organization to succeed, there must be a personal commitment on the part of the Chief of Naval Operations and/or the Secretary of the Navy to such integrated long-range planning.
3. Despite the need for commitment by the highest policy makers planning groups should not be so tightly controlled as to be identified exclusively with a single policy maker whose departure will terminate their usefulness and influence. A good illustration of this problem is found in Admiral Zumwalt's sponsorship of Project 2000, which was not followed up on by his successor and therefore has had virtually no impact. If the project had been the responsibility of an established planning office rather than a personally selected ad hoc group,

⁹⁵Ibid., Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 67-71.

it is possible that its chances for survival as an ongoing endeavor within the Office of the CNO would have been improved.

4. The long-range planning group should be organizationally located "close to the throne," with direct access to high policy makers.
5. While the long-range planning group should be primarily concerned with the broad future of the Navy, it cannot and should not be isolated from current problems. It should have access to, and the opportunity to comment on, short range and operational plans. One of the most useful functions performed by OP-93 in the 1950s was its review of current policy developments to assess their possible impact on the Navy's ability to achieve its long-term objectives.
6. A long-range planning group must be considered important enough by high policy makers so that its studies will have an impact on Navy policy and operations. Among other things this means that policy makers must be sensitive to the uncertainties involved in any attempt to predict the future; efforts to quantify the accuracy of the planning groups studies are likely to undermine both its morale and its effectiveness. In addition, in order to ensure that the long-range planning group's work will be good enough to prove its worth to policy makers, the office must be staffed by personnel of broad experience and high caliber, and work well done must be recognized and rewarded.

Three gems of wisdom are also expressed by the study panel which will be applied to and expounded upon in the discussion later of a corps of Naval strategists.

1. Any planning system which is instituted must be carefully adapted to current circumstances and constraints.
2. Neither a General Board nor a Long Range Objectives Group as originally constituted could work effectively within the current political environment of the Pentagon.

3. Given the multiple problems facing the U.S. Navy today, it is certain that no single organizational change can provide the necessary solutions.⁹⁶

Conclusion

In mid-January 1980, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, renewed past concerns for a long term view of the Navy's requirements and strategies. He instituted a series of wide ranging organizational changes in the Office of the CNO which will serve as a foundation and point of departure for the next chapter.

In proposing a system for long-range planning that can be useful to the Navy, be adapted to current imperatives and provide long term guidance it is necessary that there be an understanding of the experiences of others faced with a unique environment for planning. The Navy's future poses such a unique environment for assessment of its objectives. The above description of past Navy attempts to create a continuous and consistent planning process is a necessary foundation for analyzing why past planning techniques failed and how they may be adapted to today's milieu.

⁹⁶Ibid., Maritime Balance Study p. A-19-20.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CORPS OF NAVAL STRATEGISTS

"Neither our political nor our military system makes it suitable that we should have a general staff organized like the German general staff or like the French general staff; but the common experience of mankind is that the things which those general staffs do, have to be done in every well-managed and well-directed army, and they have to be done by a body of men especially assigned to do them. We should have such a body of men selected and organized in our own way and in accordance with our own system to do these essential things. The most intelligible way to describe such a body of men, however selected and organized is by calling it a general staff, because its duties are staff duties and are general in their character." Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1902.⁹⁷

This proposal for a corps of Naval strategists is designed as an aid to meet the strategic planning needs of the present-day U.S. Navy. An admittedly modest change is envisioned as a beginning in improving the planning process of the Navy. If deemed beneficial, it may lead to other modifications to the system which could vastly improve the Navy's ability to meet its growing responsibilities. The proposal will be presented in three sections. The first is a justification for a single command member as the planner rather than a consolidated group tasked with strategic planning responsibilities for the entire Navy. Secondly, a description the

⁹⁷Walter Millis, American Military Thought, p. 256.

unique education and training procedure for strategic planners will be offered. Lastly, a delineation of the specific responsibilities and collateral functions of the Naval strategist will serve to explain the usefulness of the proposed change to the Navy planning system. Implementation of this plan will usher in a method for;

1. improving the effectiveness of Navy planning by enhancing the efficiency, continuity, consistency and day-to-day planning in the Navy to the point of allowing increased time for longer lead time and broader scope planning
2. create a function within every command staff that is concerned almost exclusively with long-term proximate results of command decisions and actions

A. THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE

A widely held assumption is that no single change to the Navy's planning system will be able to correct the weakness in the present process. Sweeping changes are frankly not possible in our representative society without major upheaval. Within the present norm, our plans for the future are steeped in the impressions of the past. American cultural and political characteristics indicate incontrovertibly that a rise to dominant militarism embodied in a general staff patterned after that of Germany is not a possibility unless the society is radically altered, perhaps to the extreme of going mad.

Two characteristics of American society seem to preclude the development of and adherence to a long-range strategy, they are impatience⁹⁸ and a lack of continuity.

⁹⁸ American cultural impatience is a focus of the following works; Stanley Hoffman, "Restraints and Choices in American

"The crusading spirit is marked by impatience and irritation with time-consuming complexity. Americans believe that, with a little common sense and know-how, things can be done in a hurry. Neither protracted, limited war nor costly, sustained programs for military preparedness fit this temper of the American mind."⁹⁹

The decision-making framework in the United States is based on a cyclic influx of new ideas and perspectives. At the apex of the decision-making pyramid are popularly elected officials who are subject to confidence votes every two for Congress, four years for the executive branch and six year intervals for the Senate. This unfortunately is partly responsible for and perpetuates both the societal impatience and discontinuity.¹⁰⁰ Government officials cannot support initiatives whose long term effects on the future are more favorable to America than a short-term, more politically feasible alternative when the official's continuance in his position is laid to arbitration on regular short-term bases. Viable long-range plans generally depend upon current

Foreign Policy," Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 39, Gabriel Almond, "Public Opinion, Opinion-Makers, and Foreign Policy," Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 57, and A. Russell Buchanan, "American Attitude Toward War," Ibid., Deconde, p. 16.

⁹⁹ Amos A. Jordan, and William J. Taylor, Jr., American National Security, (Baltimore: The Johns and Hopkins University Press, 1981) p. 54.

¹⁰⁰ Stanley Hoffman, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy," Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 37.

sacrifices for success. Sir Robert Thompson, an observer of America's difficulties in Vietnam offered a fairly common cultural appraisal,

"weaknesses in the American character were to play their part. Of these, the most important is impatience...more than any other factor, coupled with the frustration which automatically follows, it has led to a desire for quick results."¹⁰¹

Discontinuity within the military planning structure is a product of career-demand personnel changes, identity of long range studies with particular policy makers who remain in any position no more than four years, a lack of institutionalized consensus on the proper course of action, among other reasons.

1. An Alternative to the Group Approach

"The springs of policy bubble up; they do not trickle down. Dean Acheson¹⁰²

Considering the present structure of the U.S. Navy - interest peddling program sponsors, the cycle of changing the CNO at least every four years, the annual budget cycle, the three major warfare specialties among other considerations - evidence points to establishing an alternative to the present long-range planning system where the function is not instilled in a selective, consolidated group. Committees with a

¹⁰¹Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam, (New York: David McCay Co., Inc., 1969) p. 125.

¹⁰²Dean Acheson, "Thoughts About Thought in High Places," ed. Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965) p. 296.

reasonable degree of influence on the course of Navy planning must have access to, yet not become identified with top policy makers, they must carry executive authority, and represent but be independent of operational, logistical and technological division imperatives, be able to operate under given long-range fiscal projections but remain flexible enough to accommodate short term budget constraints. The establishment of so adroit a committee is not impossible, but in any period short of declared war the creation of such a group is well beyond the probable.

In mid-January 1980, the CNO Admiral Thomas Hayward instituted fundamental, useful changes in the OPNAV structure. Partly because of his concern for the Navy's future and partly to counter the view of certain "key decision makers outside the Navy" that the service was suffering from disorganization, inefficiency, and disunity, he commissioned several study groups to assess the Navy's ability to plan and meet the needs of its future. One study proved to be too controversial to publish but as far as is known its recommendations were very similar to recommendations of other study groups.¹⁰³ Admiral Hayward's solution was to partially

¹⁰³ This study, personally commissioned by Admiral Hayward was conducted by Dr. Victor Basiuk. Dr. Basiuk is a Naval Reserve captain, political scientist, expert on national science policy, and former associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. The focus of his recommendations is very much in line with the recommendations of The Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Planning

resurrect the old OP-97, the Office of Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems (1967-1972), but added tactical nuclear plans and policy and nuclear arms control negotiations to its list of responsibilities. He created a Directorate of Naval Warfare (OP-95) to provide better liaison between OPNAV and the fleet, and to integrate programs across the individual warfare specialty lines of communications. And lastly, he established a dedicated long-range planning function in the immediate office of the CNO, the first such division in nearly a decade.

2. Toward a Process Not a Product

By his efforts in 1980, Admiral Hayward responded to recommendations of the various study panels when he created a Long Range Planning Group (OP-00X). Located within the immediate office of the CNO, Admiral Hayward assigned OP-00X as a permanent fixture in the OPNAV structure administratively equal to OP-00K, the Executive Panel composed of outside experts. Functionally, OP-00X was to operate as OP-93 had several years earlier. Group members reported directly to the CNO and were drawn from officers possessing broad experience and expertise in warfare and planning specialties.

and the Maritime Balance Study: An Experiment, discussed earlier. A major point stressed in the former findings was that the input of the increasingly powerful platform sponsor offices should be balanced by planners who viewed Navy programs as a whole. Telephone interview with Dr. Basiuk and Dr. Rosenberg in November 1979. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives on Long Range Planning of the Navy, p. 77.

The first director of OP-00X, early Admiral selectee Charles R. Larson was a uniquely qualified Naval officer. A 1958 Naval Academy graduate, Admiral Larson was first a Naval aviator who transferred to nuclear submarine duty, ultimately commanding the USS Halibut (SSN-587). He served as a White House Fellow under President Johnson and later served as Naval Aide to President Nixon. At the time of his appointment as head of OP-00X, Admiral Larson was director of OP-21, the Strategic Submarine Division, with responsibility for providing OPNAV guidance on the Polaris, Poseidon and Trident submarine programs.

Admiral Larson assembled a small staff of broadly talented officers, but all met the essential requirement, that they possess the understanding for conducting solid strategic planning. Members of the group were chosen and assigned according to their expertise to fill the role of a Technology Planner, a Politico-Military Planner, a Resources Planner, a Program Planner and an intelligence analyst.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴As originally staffed, OP-00X's deputy director was a surface warfare officer with an MS in management and experience as a destroyer squadron commander and as commander of the NATO Standing Naval Force, Atlantic; the Technology Planner was surface warfare officer with a submarine background and Ph.D. in engineering (physical oceanography) from M.I.T.; the Resources Planner was surface officer with a doctorate in business administration from the Harvard Business School; the Politico-Military Planner was a jet attack pilot with an M.A. in international relations from Oxford; and the Program Planner was an experienced F-14 Naval Flight Officer with a background in budgeting and programming. Memorandum,

The achievements of so obviously qualified, specialized, and supported a group as OP-00X will not be realized for quite some time. As the result of a recognized need for long-range planning in the Navy and the personal concerns of the top Navy policy maker, OP-00X ushered in a new trend for Navy planning groups. In contrast to OP-93's plans or objectives statements which were considered the most important part of long-range planning, OP-00X focused on the planning process where top policy makers established their organization's objectives and decided upon strategies to meet those goals. The product was subordinate to the process.

"many (by no means all) U.S. General Staff members are carefully selected, but few are "hand-picked" in the manner of the Prussian model, where the pool of top-quality applicants annually outnumbered appointees by forty-fifty to one. There is no probation period. Recurring assignments are the exception, rather than the rule. The experience base therefore builds slowly and demands constant refurbishment. Institutional memories are rarely long. New officers relearn old lessons, at increased costs measured in time, money, wasted motion, lost leverage and sometimes, in lost lives."¹⁰⁵

Unfortunately, a Naval tradition has continued as Admiral Watkins, the new CNO as of June 1982, disbanded OP-00X and

Rear Admiral Charles R. Larson, to the Executive Assistant to the Chief of the Naval Operations, Subject: Officer Manning for the Long Range Planning Group (OP-00X), Serial 21/302884, December 4, 1979. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 82-83.

¹⁰⁵ John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning A Critique, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) p. 57.

shifted its function to OP-00K, the Executive Panel. The impact of this move remains to be seen.

This proposal for an arrangement in naval planning that can serve as a stop gap approach to improve efficiency in the day-to-day operations of the Navy should result in some progress in developing a longer range view of the Navy future until a system is instituted which addresses more of the Navy's needs. Continuity and consistency in Navy planning is urgently needed today because of increasing responsibilities in an increasingly threatening environment and ever more constraining resource limitations. Disbursal of specially trained, knowledgeable strategic planners throughout the command and staff structure of the Navy will bridge the gap between the operations and decision-makers, those who plan and those who carry out orders, those concerned with today and those concentrating on tomorrow.

3. Education and Training: the Key

"Always be more than you seem." General von Molke¹⁰⁶

Naval officers selected to serve as Naval strategists will, by necessity, be very special individuals, loyalty should overshadow ambition, reason should shade genius, resourcefulness be valued over end-product orientation and curiosity blank complacency.

¹⁰⁶Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957) p. 51.

"to be a capable long-range planner, one must, in my view, be uncomfortable with the status quo, must be continuously reexamining, questioning, probing-- searching for weakness and ways to make improvements in the present way of doing things."¹⁰⁷

He must gain broad experience in a very short time, and develop wisdom that hides his years. The Naval strategist career will demand communication skills, and aplomb so that precious little time or knowledge is lost in translation between decision maker, planner and operational commander.

The Naval strategist will operate in a presently existing Navy Department or fleet staff, but more importantly will be a link in a Navy-wide network of Naval strategists. Sole loyalty for the strategist will be to the commander or director of the staff to which he is assigned but constant communication between strategists will be maintained to offer support, advice and insight to individual strategists. Ideally, the position of Vice Chief of Naval Operations would be held by a career Naval strategist who should be able to coordinate all long-range Naval planning through the network reaching through the various command and staff strata of the Navy.

Viewed from a perspective of authority, power and influence,¹⁰⁸ the position occupied by the Naval strategist

¹⁰⁷ Letter from Admiral George Miller to David A. Rosenberg, 23 July 1979. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 52.

¹⁰⁸ For a description of the authority, power, influence relationship consult, Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, February, 1962, p. 31-41.

will carry no authority. The source of his usefulness to the Navy be as the repository for the command corporate knowledge, his experienced and educated broad perspective on maritime and national matters and his concentration of energies on overall, long-range strategies. The Naval strategist will not possess or convey any command authority but will be valuable to the command policy formulation and decision maker by increasing the effectiveness of the commander's staff organization. This enhanced effectiveness will produce more credible, thoroughly researched military plans and advice, more consistent and innovative policy inputs thereby increasing the power of the commander. This power is translated into greater influence being exerted by the command level authority in dealings with higher level command within the Navy, with the Secretary of Defense and other departments within the military establishment.

Specialized education is an essential element in the preparation process of a Naval strategist.

"Probably the most revolutionary aspect of the Prussian system was its assumption that genius was superfluous, and even dangerous and that reliance must be placed upon average men succeeding by superior education, organization and experience. This approach, on the one hand, subordinated the individual to the collective will and intelligence of the whole, and yet guaranteed to the individual wide freedom of action so long as he remained upon his proper level and within his sphere of responsibility. It was the antithesis of the eighteenth century theory of the military genius. English observers of the Prussian system were impressed by the absence of the slavish

and mechanical obedience to superiors characteristic of other armies and the particular function without intervening in the duties of others."109

Though a uniquely trained Naval officer, it is important that the Naval strategist be assigned as an Unrestricted Line Officer. Selection of strategists should be on a volunteer basis since the officer may face limited command and promotion opportunities. Acceptance into training as a Naval strategist can take place at the commissioning source, the Naval Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, Officer Candidate School at Newport or Aviation Officers Candidate School and the point in one's career at which primary warfare qualification is earned i.e., SWO for surface, wings for Aviation officers and dolphins for submarine officers.

Training for a Naval strategist, other than undergraduate degree requirements, does not deviate from the normal career path for junior officers until at the point of warfare designation. Prospective strategists should be assigned to Norfolk Naval Station or within the San Diego Naval complex. Both areas of assignment have contingents representing the major warfare specialties, aviation, surface and submarine forces. Initial sea tours for Naval strategists will include designation as a primary warfare specialist, within the first two to two and one half years followed by experience including a major deployment in the remaining two warfare specialties.

Proposed Assignment Flow For Strategists

5 Years	2Yr	5 Years	5 Years	5 Years	5 Years	3 Years
Primary	N	OPNAV	2nd Fleet/ Cinclantflt	JCS	6th Fleet/ Cinclant	CNO Staff
Warfare	P		3rd Fleet Cincpacflt	NATO	7th Fleet/ Cincpac	
Training	S					

A typical training flow for a Naval strategist assigned to the Norfolk area, might begin with aircrew training as a Naval Flight Officer in the E-2 Hawkeye aircraft following designation through the AOCS pipeline. As the eyes of the carrier task group, the E-2 radar surveillance aircraft provides its operators with a unique view of combined naval forces' threats, capabilities and difficulties. It is the prime communications link while deployed, for surface, submarine and airborne combatants. Knowledge, gained by experience with this vital link between the task force commander, his ready forces and higher echelon authority is crucial to the planning effort. No better vantage point exists in the fleet to gaining this experience than the airborne command post E-2 aircraft.

After completing one squadron sea tour and at least one major deployment, the strategist would then move to a

surface or subsurface unit for experience in both other specialties. It is strongly recommended that for surface training, duty aboard a unit of a Cruiser Destroyer Group be assigned. Cruiser duty offers an opportunity for experience in operations which combine surface, subsurface and aviation units. An understanding of anti-submarine operations is essential for strategic planners and there is no better exposure to the environment than aboard a cruiser. Decisions upon which ship or squadron designation is based would include deployment schedules, billet availability, sequencing of strategists' assignments for maximum experience and exposure to the latest fleet capabilities and platforms. Prior to the completion of warfare training in the three primary specialties the strategic planner should have completed the correspondence courses offered through the Naval War College.¹¹⁰ Single siting a prospective strategist for the first five years of training and for most of his career will reduce permanent change of station order fund requirements, improve the continuity of staff planning by lengthened tours and offer

¹¹⁰ On a basis of 5-7 hours per week the series of courses should require no more than three years of study. The graduate level series of courses includes the subject areas of Employment of Naval Forces, Strategy and Policy, Defense Economics and Decision Making, with electives offered in International Law and International Relations. A nonresident diploma is issued by the Naval War College for anyone successfully completing the course of study. Additionally, graduate level credit and Reserve officer retirement points are credited upon completion.

small material incentives to the strategist to compensate for other lost opportunities in the Naval Service.

Recognition as an Unrestricted Line Officer and designation as a primary Warfare Specialist will enhance the two-way communications between planner and operator and guard against the isolation of the planner from the real world of fleet operations. Additionally, it will help maintain for the Navy a degree of operational value in the strategic planner, should the urgency of wartime dictate that his skills in the fleet override his planning function. Essentially, for the few qualified naval strategists, their specialties are the reverse of their contemporaries. The 0026 General Strategic Planning subspecialty becomes the primary skill for a planner and his fleet operational designations are relegated to secondary specialties for him.

In all likelihood the prospective strategist will not reach major division officer or department head level in any of the commands to which he is attached for training in the first five years. Aspirations to command should not be a compelling drive for strategists. From the Prussian example we recognize the improbability that the battlefield leader is also the chief planner for operations. Not since the relatively simple days of Frederick the Great and Napoleon has a single military genius sufficed for both field commander and chief of staff. Complexities of modern war and peace make specialization an imperative.

Every effort should be made to assign the prospective strategist to billets within each command that will allow the maximum exposure to operational demands as possible. Only in rare situations should the trainee be assigned to a position required for the career progression of regular URL officers. For instance, the prospective strategist should not expect a department head billet and perhaps not even a major division officer job. Where possible, the planner under training should not count against a commanding officer's manpower allocation. He should be placed in departments and divisions where he will receive the most comprehensive survey of the necessary skills for fleet operators, the environmental demands, fiscal and manpower constraints and the valuable communications idiosyncrasies of each warfare specialty which can only be gained first hand.

Following the five year assignment in the various warfare specialties the prospective Naval strategist should have a thorough understanding of fleet operations. It is doubtful that any officer could or has gained as broad a working knowledge of so complex a military arm if the officer had been confined to a single warfare specialty.

Formal educational experience becomes a must for Naval strategist to progress to the career applications stage. The sequence of training is important so too is the orientation of the institution chosen for study. An academic segment not founded on and focused by operational experience would be

far less productive than the reverse. More effective use of the strategic planning theories and skills will be realized if applied to the operational framework gained by experience and understood in terms of the context within which the planner will be expected to perform.

The Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, single sites the best training in three very important fields of study for the Naval planner. The 686 Strategic Planning-General curriculum provides the detailed fundamentals of strategic planning, the necessary global relations knowledge as well as economics, computer applications, intelligence/threat assessments and methods for long-range Navy planning. Four weeks should be allotted to a quota for each strategic planner to attend the Defense Resources Management Education Center located at the Naval Postgraduate School. The course offers the systems analysis-oriented approach to applied decision-making. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, just a short distance from NPS provides an outstanding opportunity to learn about nuclear weapons design, development and applications.

Having coupled formal educational experience with operational on-the-job training, the Naval planner is ready for assignment to a strategic planning billet.¹¹¹ Naval

¹¹¹A Cohort Tracking Analysis done by the Subspecialty Procurement Control Branch of Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) dated 8 April, 1980 for Total Force Planning Division

policy originates in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV. It is important that as early as possible the linkage be made between the fleet and the seat of policy formulation. Upon assignment to OP-06 Plans, Policy and Operations Division the Naval planner should have a quota reserved to attend the scenario build-up, the war and debrief for war games at the Naval War College.

Subsequent assignments to a tour at OPNAV should be determined by service needs and a matching of planner specialization to command/staff needs. As suggested in Fig. 1, planners will still rotate between sea and shore duty, but never should any assignment last for less than five years.

B. DUTIES OF THE NAVAL STRATEGISTS

"common sense is not an abundant commodity, and the practice of thinking problems through is exceedingly rare, especially among persons whose conclusions are untrammelled by responsibility. The layman unacquainted with the prevailing ideas of strategy will, when confronted with a strategic problem, frequently venture unwise proposals. Yet intelligence and an inclination to think are indispensable even when one is conversant with the principles - among professionals as well as laymen. Adherence to one principle frequently demands violation of another, and there is no principle but admits of exceptions. Wars cannot be fought according to books of rules.

(OP-11) showed that of the Naval Officers receiving funded graduate educational from 1971-1979, 29.3% had not been assigned a tour of validated utilization billet. Overall subspecialty utilization peak was less than 80%. This resulted in a loss of over \$8,000,000 for the period between 1971 and 1975. Naval Audit Service, Western Region, Audit Number A10110/A10100, dated 3 October, 1980, p. 9-10 and Exhibit B.

The admiral or general who adheres inflexibly to any set of preconceived commandments is hardly likely to be a victor against a resourceful opponent."¹¹²

The duties assigned to the Naval strategists must vary by the number of billets, the wide variety of commands and staffs to which they may be assigned and the changing nature of day-to-day Navy operations. The specific duties will remain an ill-defined set of responsibilities. The planning process is crucial to any military undertaking. The planning function is much too important a function to be left to officers who can only devote part-time attention to planning. The requirements of the command career path demand that an officer concentrate on developing the skills and knowledge necessary to command naval units and combatants in wartime. Even if there are star-quality individuals who can meet the demands of the command ladder and the planning role, since his time must be divided between the two functions, continuity of the planning process will suffer.

The Naval strategic planner will offer a long-range perspective on all plans and policy inputs that is gained not by innate brilliance but by longevity in command assignments, broad-based educational and operational expertise and full-time, focussed attention to planning. The strategic planner could possibly be the only command/staff officer "trammelled by responsibility." As a result of assignment duration, the

¹¹²Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) p. 11.

planner may be the individual involved with a plan from the drawing board to operational execution or through the approval stage for contingency plans.

Efforts should be made, though to maintain a separation between the long-range planner and those who implement the accepted plans. When execution of a plan begins planning for following events ceases. The German General Staff sought to couple planning and operations to minimize translation disconnects. Results of German campaigns show that planning and preparation for war, especially for short limited wars or for wars that did not come, was truly outstanding. However, the planning of the German staff system was less effective during protracted campaigns where initial plans were thwarted, they were also less effective when technology and complexity increased as witnessed during World War I.

Under the proposed Navy system the operational command/staff plans would still generate all staff plans but would allow review and recommendation by the strategic planner before submittal. The long-range planner would measure proposed plans against proximate long term results of actions.

The conventional wisdom claims that only operationally-oriented officers - those from the trenches - are the only officers who can plan realistically. Decidedly, the planner must understand the dilemmas faced by operational commitments and he must recognize and appreciate the special needs of

those engaged in war or peacetime exercises. Without a "trench of the future" in which to gain experience, the planner is forced into a mode for which the military has been criticized, that of planning for future wars in terms of lessons from the last war.

1. Fusionism

There are valid concerns expressed from inside and outside the military, that any movement by officers away from the "naval line" can develop momentum and swing so far as to create an elite class within the military. One such concern involves the purist or fusionist view of military advice. The debate, though originally centered on the credibility of military advice, carries over into all forms of civilian-military interaction. The purist view expressed most staunchly by most but not all World War II senior officers calls for strict adherence to the separation of military leaders from matters of policy other than military. General Matthew Ridgeway, army chief of staff in 1955 summarized the purist view of military advice when he offered,

"The military advisor should give his competent professional advice based on the military aspects of the programs referred to him, based on his fearless, honest, objective estimate of the national interest, and regardless of administration policy at any particular time. He should confine his advice to the essential military aspects."¹¹³

¹¹³Matthew Ridgeway's "Farewell Letter" to Secretary of Defense Charles R. Wilson, June 27, 1955.

General Douglas MacArthur further extended the purist point of view beyond military advice,

"Your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable - it is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication."¹¹⁴

The fusionist proponents contend that the foreign policy environment evident after World War II meant "there was no such thing as purely military considerations."¹¹⁵

Surprisingly, another senior military leader General Maxwell Taylor voiced the counter argument, fusionism.

"Nothing is so likely to repel the civilian decision-makers as a military argument which omits obvious considerations which the President cannot omit. If the Chiefs (of Staff) are concerned only about the record, it may be very well to try to abstract the military elements of a problem and to deal with them alone; but if they want to persuade a President, they had better look at the totality of his problem and try to give maximum help."¹¹⁶

Civilian leaders universally tend to favor the fusionists broader ranged advice over the strict military input to policy formulation. Difficult political decisions can be made less so if military advisors offer up militarily weakened but more politically feasible solutions. Knowledgeable

¹¹⁴ Douglas MacArthur, Address delivered at West Point, May 12, 1962.

¹¹⁵ Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., American National Security Policy and Process, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1981) p. 168.

¹¹⁶ Maxwell D. Taylor, Address delivered at West Point, February 18, 1969.

civilians are as equally divided over the issue as military leaders. Robert Lovett, former secretary of war and under-secretary of state, believed that,

"The ability of the military expert to give wise advice and to get it listened to by policy-making officials depends in great measure on his possessing knowledge in key non-military fields and in seeing issues in broad perspective. A military career officer must be highly skilled in his own profession, but he cannot afford to become trapped in narrow professionalism."¹¹⁷

The noted military historian Samuel P. Huntington, became an early critic of fusionism when he warned that if the military

"broadened its professional world view in order to incorporate civilian defined political realities, it might gain access to the supreme levels of the policy process; but it would no longer speak on strategic matters from a military perspective... he believed that fusionism makes it inevitable that military and political responsibilities will be hopelessly intertwined in a confusing and debilitating manner."¹¹⁸

The international and multidimensional aspect of the Second World War introduced a complexity to military operations on a scale not previously reached. Now that the present level of overlap and complication has been reached, the growing interdependence the global actors demands that the political, economic and physiological implications of military action must be considered and compensated for.

¹¹⁷ Robert Lovett, Address delivered at West Point, May 1964.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 163.

Having a member of each major command or staff serving the role of fusionist on an otherwise purist staff can be a measure of compromise. Each school of thought, fusionist and purist, can be assured that its interest in policy making is being addressed and negotiated in the planning process. An experienced, well-informed naval strategist could bridge the gap between the military planning staffs that could operate more efficiently if concentrating purely on military planning. Resident fusionist review and advice applied to all plans before submittal would incrementally improve the odds of approval when the plans are interjected into the strata of arbitration through which military plans must pass for approval.

2. Non-relational Strategies

Since the days of the Prussian staff journeys, military strategists have focussed their planning efforts toward relational strategies. The Prussian reformer Scharnhorst demanded that all General Staff planners be thoroughly familiar with the elements of a specific, anticipated battle. Terrain, enemy fortifications, weapons, tactics, numbers, capabilities, intentions, estimates of sustainability were all considered must items for campaign planning. The foundation for Prussian strategies were based relationally to those anticipated from the enemy in any encounter.

Nothing more than a mention can be made here of another perspective on planning to be used by strategic planners, that of non-relational strategies. There are unique characteristics of each military force that should be taken into account whenever offensive or defensive strategies are addressed. Nations possess certain assets, vulnerabilities and inherent impediments to progress. Those national characteristics must be regarded in all plans. A sought after offensive capability cannot ignore resource, production or technology limitations even if deemed necessary to counter a confirmed or perceived enemy threat. Nations can do some things better than other things. It should not build a defense for which it is not suited just to counter an enemy's offense. A national defense planner must insure that adequate defenses are in being. With long lead times required for the development and deployment of new weapons which require larger shares of national resources, planners must strive to provide national defense by matching assets to needs. The nonrelational strategic perspective would support America's forward deployed/power projection strategy, because it is a relatively small, ocean dependent nation with secure borders. The more easily formed relational strategy perspective is probably why a small land-mass nation as the United States would consider improved concentrated land-based nuclear missiles as a primary military strength even after the Soviet Union has demonstrated an ability to neutralize the land-based

nuclear option. A lower level application of nonrelational strategies might establish policies in dealing with the rising concerns with Third World nations by the far more powerful yet in many respect impotent U.S. strength. Rather than supplying arms to small nations to combat external-supported internal conflict, the United States could adopt a bold stance of notifying the world that it will cordon off the contested area from outside interference until the original internal unrest is reduced.

Nonrelational strategies parallel the indirect approach to military planning espoused by Andre Beaufre, Liddell Hart and others.¹¹⁹ The major difference between the two approaches is the focus of indirect strategies, including other than purely military avenues such as economic, political and unconventional means.

The above instruments can be used by the strategic planner to add a new angle on difficult problems, perhaps uncovering an undiscovered avenue for finding a solution. Nothing will replace objective, detached and farsighted approaches to strategic planning. The strategic planner cannot rely only on mental abilities, but resourcefulness, experience gained by longer duration assignments and his ability to see problems clearly will provide a great service to the Navy and its future.

¹¹⁹ Beaufre views indirect strategy as including all elements of warfare, psychological, military, economic, political, diplomatic, etc. Hart focuses primarily on indirect approaches to battlefield, military tactics and strategies.

The two prime responsibilities of the naval strategist are first to do what is required to improve the day to day effectiveness of the command to which he is assigned so that more time is made available for increased lead time in all command functions. Secondly, the strategist should force and maintain his sights on the long term aspects and implications of command and navy-wide objectives. With naval strategists assigned to staffs or commands for five year minimum tours of duty, the opportunities for enhanced efficiency and continuity would be outstanding. Indoctrination of newly arrived command personnel by a locally experienced naval strategist could greatly reduce the time required for command members to begin functioning in their new assignment.

Strategic planners will make a command or staff function more efficient b u t it is paramount that effectiveness be improved. Efficiency is but one of many ingredients in effectiveness.

V. BENEFITS OF THE CORPS OF NAVAL STRATEGISTS

Where there is no vision, the people perish.
Proverbs 29:18

Many of the ills that befall attempts to improve the effectiveness of Navy long-range planning cannot be overcome without fundamental and sweeping changes to the American structure. Elements in the nature of both the American socio-political systems and within the Navy itself, preclude the formulation and adherence to a long-range strategy without continual revision. The pluralistic democracy is obliged to accommodate a wide variety of views in almost all matters of state including the size, composition and employment of military forces. An historical review of U. S. Navy long-range planning reveals a propensity to commission ad hoc study groups to define and recommend courses of future actions for Navy planning. To incorporate the suggestions of various study panels, each Chief of Naval Operations creates a new division responsible for long-range planning. When personally administered and identified with a particular Navy leader its fate is sealed with the changing of Navy command leadership.

In a system where millions of voters wield political power of representation and Naval leadership changes course regularly, a consensus is rarely reached on issues that are timely and optimum.

"Most grand strategists also must contend with national myths and tradition. In the United States, these are intensely inhibitive, as the following samples suggest:

1. Never strike the first blow.
2. Fight "fairly in accord with 'the rules'".
3. Champion the underdog.
4. Avoid secret alliances and agreements.
5. Submit all major strategic decisions for popular approval.
6. Support minimum forces in peacetime; mobilize for war.¹²⁰

Optimality is not necessary as long as resources remain sufficient. So far, U. S. actions have been adequate to meet demands but without foresight and resolve, future adequacy cannot be guaranteed. Unanimity among so disparate a people is only achieved after evidence of urgency becomes overwhelming. Reinforcement of suspicions must far outweigh any possibility of judgement error. Consensus is forged by fear and is quickly dissipated after the lessening of tensions.

Analytical processes after confirmation of the need for action will generally only support the alternative which will most efficiently and expeditiously erradicate the present danger or concern. The course of action is rarely aimed at preventing a reoccurrence. Little thought is given to the environment that will result from the chosen action; focus is on solution of the problem short term. Public sentiment

¹²⁰ John M. Collins, Grand Strategy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 20.

hobbles bold political or military adventurism while at the same time preventing sudden or excessive swings of the state pendulum. This balance is crucial to a society such as that in America. The global milieu, evident in the early part of this century could easily accommodate the plodding, deliberate response of American policy. Rapid communications which force or give the impression of forcing rapid decisions has overtaxed the decision making process in existence today. Short term decision requirements, outpace and swamp the decision process and leave no time or freedom for long-range thinking. Only a totalitarian (dictator) state is capable of producing and adhering to a long-range strategy, because of its centrality of decision-making, single focus of ambition and command of resources.

The decision-making and policy formulation framework of the United States has not kept pace with the changes of the past few decades.

"In 1939 the United States had no military alliances and no troops stationed in any foreign country. Except on the high seas and within North America, the nation had no offensive capability at all ...One generation later... the United States had military alliances with 48 nations, had 1,517,000 soldiers and sailors stationed in 119 countries, and had a military capacity sufficient to destroy the world many times over.¹²¹

Post World War II planners were forced to contend with an international environment gravely more dangerous and

¹²¹Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Military and American Society: An Overview", The Military and America Society, Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr., (New York: The Free Press, 1972) p. 3-4.

threatening than known in the pre-war times. Perhaps more importantly for the post-war planners was the realization that the new environment where the United States was thrust to the position of Free World leader, no longer responded to the set of rules to which planners had become accustomed.

"We confronted a world dominated by three factors foreign to our experience."

1. The emergence of the United States into a position of power
2. The emergence of the USSR with equal power
3. New warfare reduced all conventional military and diplomatic solutions to uncertainties, air delivered atomic weapons were the most salient.¹²²

Elsewhere the author amplifies the impact of atomic weapons on future planners by stating:

"in the very last days of the great conflict the power of airborne demolition bombardment had been suddenly stepped up by a factor of 20,000. Nothing like this had ever happened before. The weapons and techniques developed in the course of earlier wars had usually carried important hints of coming change, but no one such revolutionary change as this had actually been demonstrated. This eleventh-hour triumph of the embattled scientists altered at a stroke almost every calculation and every formula on which statesmen, strategists and military technicians had been accustomed to rely. The general staffs of 1914 - highly trained, thoroughly expert and devoted men of war - had compounded a disaster for which there seemed no answer. So the mobilized scientists of 1945 - also highly trained, expert and devoted to the furtherance of the country's interest - had compounded a terrible problem

¹²²Walter, Arms and Men, (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc. 1958) p. 273.

for which no rational solution was apparent to themselves or to anyone else."¹²³

The threatening environment continues to compound the problem for strategists. The Navy has produced many viable long-range plans but their acceptability has most often been short-lived. Plans to meet long-range shipbuilding needs are complicated by long lead times for design, production and deployment and the rapid pace of technological advances rendering some equipment obsolete before introduction to the fleet. This longer lead time for Navy equipment added the array of planning obstacles present in the other services, suggests that the Navy create a planning system that adapts readily to change yet is effective over the long term.

One step toward devising an effective planning system could be to compile the advantages of past attempts, delineate safeguards against past disadvantages then weave that data into the framework of recommendations offered by Navy commissioned study panels. From the German General Staff concept it was revealed that the education of planners is essential to military planning. Military organizational expertise must be promoted by specialization of duty, thorough knowledge of operational, material, geographical and personnel capability constraints. This specialized training should be gained and updated by near permanent staff assignments augmented by close contact with field units. Command aspirations must be secondary

¹²³Ibid., Millis, p. 270.

to planning functions which require longevity for attainment and full time attention for maintenance.

Disadvantages inherent in the general staff concept stemmed from rigidity and the lack of checks on ambition. The inflexibility of the staff system was born out of elitism in a single dominant service, the army. Complications resulted when a system which had been functioning, successful and supreme, for several decades was forced to accommodate and acquiesce to the use of naval and air forces. Operating under the control of a single ruler meant that the influence exerted by military commanders was inversely proportional to the strength of the monarch. The fatal rise to militarism came as a result of natural organizational predation, the military expanded to the limits of its confines. With a weak but ambitious ruler giving way to military adventurism, all obstacles to military dominance are erased. Reviewing modern democratic states projects a considerable degree of assurance that control by a single individual or rampant militarism is hardly conceivable today.

A prime objective of the General Staff concept was to closely link planning with operations. Efficiency of translation from plan to execution resulted because of the offensive ambitions and presumed eventual execution of Prussian war aims. It is an assumption of this proposal that at least in modern times, planning stops when execution of the plan is begun unless a degree of isolation is maintained between the crisis managers and the long-range strategists.

Two important hard-earned lessons from corporate strategic planning are directly applicable to military planning.

1. Whichever system is devised to serve the planning function must be adapted to the organization.¹²⁴
2. Long-range planning is the responsibility of top management, but the line must have a voice.¹²⁵

Having those responsible for long-range planning dispersed throughout the various command levels within the Navy functions as an adaptation of long-range planning to each level of command and offers a voice for those who must plan operations and those who must execute the plans to the immediate decision-maker.

Past studies commissioned by the Navy to help determine its long-range planning needs¹²⁶ have espoused broad, generalized remedies for Navy planning but few feasible suggestions for implementation. The need for long-range planning is a commonly expressed recommendation; even if the plan is not accepted totally it still provides a focus for the Navy's future. Planning must be an ongoing process not controlled or identified with any one policy-maker. Planners

¹²⁴James B. Whittaker, Strategic Planning in a Rapidly Changing Environment, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1978) p. 12-13.

¹²⁵George A. Steiner, Strategic Planning, (New York: The Free Press, 1979) p. 10-11.

¹²⁶The three studies were mentioned above, "Major Organizational Considerations for the Chief of Naval Operations," "The Maritime Balance Study," and the "Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy."

should have direct access to policy makers but a planning system with a consolidated group near the CNO loses touch with the widely dispersed operating forces. Direct access to policymakers can be achieved by assignment of strategic planners to decision makers at several echelons of command. Strategic planners cannot be isolated from current problems, but their involvement should be strictly limited to long-range implications of an existing crisis. To paraphrase a statement in a speech given at the Naval Postgraduate School in November 1982, Admiral Thomas Hayward suggested that there is a very real need for systems analysis, quantification, budgeteering and programming but that their proponents should be the last inputs at the decision-maker's door. It would follow this proposal perfectly for the strategic planner to be the last into the office of the decision-maker.

As stated earlier, the specific duties of the strategic planner will vary considerably between the various commands where assigned because of the variety of command requirements. There are two primary modes of operations for the function of strategic planners at any given command staff level. The first role for the planner relates to directly supporting the command level decision-maker while the second role connects the long-range planner with the command staff responsible for the generation of command plans.

Direct support to the commander can be imagined in a front door or back door approach. At the front door to the

decision-maker, the strategic planner would be responsible for helping to structure the problems to be solved. The clarification of objectives, assessment of needs and resources, determination of alternatives, and very importantly the verification of all data would be prime assistance functions to command level decision-makers of strategic planners. The verification and translation of data would be particularly useful in joint U. S. or allied planning staffs. Army operations are not necessarily understandable in Navy terms and it is not important for Navy leaders to attempt to gain a working knowledge of other service functions when the need for such would perhaps be shortlived. The staff planner could research and present what information is necessary about other units. With the assignment longevity of strategic planners it is likely that the information would be used again and again but not have to be relearned because the same planner is available over a longer tour. Update of the desired knowledge is all that would be required. If performed properly and adequately the front door role of the strategic planner could minimize the problem definition and debate time thereby freeing up some time for the decision-maker. Small, incremental improvements in effectiveness and efficiency of the planning effort could over time, allow expansion of the staff's time horizon for plans.

The back door role for the strategic planner would be a modified role of the front door approach. A planner would

follow the same steps as above but would concentrate on verification of data, the veracity of contending proponents and the weighing of options. The planner would serve as an independent well-informed sounding board for the decision-maker during the deliberation process. A strategic planner would not overlap the duties of a chief of staff, but would support his position by the planners' staff-specific corporate memory and broad experience. Present career paths that lead to chief of staff positions tend to restrict officers to a single warfare specialty even if exposure to other specialties is gained.

The second primary role for strategic planners would center around the review process of staff plans and policy inputs. Operational staff members would continue to formulate plans just as is done presently. The strategic planner would be available to assist in any way requested but the planner's function would be to add a comment to each outgoing or approved plan. No judgment concerning the plan or policy's validity, feasibility or relevance would be made, but simply an estimate or forecast of the long-term ramifications of the proposed course of actions would be attached. Two views of this function may serve to elucidate the role. At the beginning, long-range assessments may be viewed with some skepticism, but as forecasts improve they may serve as valuable source for staff introspection and as a reminder of future consequences. Most decisions of any importance have

short-term expediences but long-term ramifications. Decisions that would better serve the distant future - solve rather than postpone a problem - but that are not politically or fiscally acceptable in the near term must still be overridden or delayed just as before. But, with a ready glimpse of proximate results of the proposed action made available to all levels of arbitration, it is hoped that an evolutionary trend of striving for the longer term solution to problems will result.

In a review phase of the planning process the strategic planner offers a new perspective on planning. If an illustration from chess is used the operational staff should plan on a basis of one to two moves ahead of the present. The staff rarely has the luxury of time to assess the strategic implications of every command action. The resident strategic planner should maintain his focus on four to five moves ahead of the present. A long-range strategic plan cannot be written for a given region or objective without taking into account all likely outcomes of any present day crisis. Current plans are drawn up to diffuse or stabilize a situation for a zero to three-year time period. The planner should view the same situational facts but map a strategy acceptable for ten to twenty years. Failure for a strategic planner at four or five moves ahead would come from an unforeseen, unanticipated outcome at the one to two move level.

A. CONCLUSION

The United States Navy has not maintained a consistent and continuous long-range strategic planning system. It is doubtful that the American societal and political realities would allow such a system to function without disruption or with independent authority. The Navy has more than met its responsibilities levied by the United States and it has planned adequately for its future needs as evidenced by its status in the world today. However, improvements can be made to the present system and, indeed, are demanded by the rapid pace of change and awesome complexity of the future environment.

After reviewing past experiences with strategic planning systems from other than U. S. national military establishments, the corporate business world and the Navy itself, it appears reasonable that a process compiled from advantages of other systems which match the recommendations of Navy study panels can evolutionally improve the effectiveness of Navy long-range planning. A network of highly educated and specifically trained officers dispersed throughout the Navy command structure could form the foundation for future improvements. The planners would augment each staff rather than compete for any staff position with other officers. They would function without authority but be an invaluable source of corporate knowledge for the decision-maker and staff. With lengthened tours of assignment and support from the strategic planner network, the addition of planners to various command staffs

should measurably improve consistency and continuity to policy formulation, avoid the hobbling effects of the career-driven rotation cycle on expertise and the staff should function as smoothly in wartime as in peacetime.

The strategic planning network could be easily introduced to the present Navy system without upheaval. An ongoing planning process such as proposed would avoid the enervating consequence of creating and disbanding a long-range planning group at intervals determined by changes in the Chief of Naval Operations. Having a core of officers experienced in all three major warfare specialties could enhance the capability of Naval forces in the application of combined arms.

It is assumed that command and promotion opportunities for strategic planners will be limited in the early stages of implementation. But when the corps of strategists is viewed as an initial step toward an eventual, much more effective system coupled with the commitment of dedicated officers, the sacrifice is acceptable. The Navy's long-range planning effectiveness could be improved manyfold by incorporating a network of skilled strategists throughout its ranks and capped by a long-serving, unparalleled strategic planner Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

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